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Abstract
Blind Quantum Computing (BQC) allows a client to have a server carry out a quantum
computation for them such that the client’s input, output and computation remain private.
A desirable property for any BQC protocol is verification, whereby the client can verify with
high probability whether the server has followed the instructions of the protocol, or if there
has been some deviation resulting in a corrupted output state. A verifiable BQC protocol can
be viewed as an interactive proof system leading to consequences for complexity theory. The
authors, together with Broadbent, previously proposed a universal and unconditionally secure
BQC scheme where the client only needs to be able to prepare single qubits in separable states
randomly chosen from a finite set and send them to the server, who has the balance of the
required quantum computational resources. In this paper we extend that protocol with new
functionality allowing blind computational basis measurements, which we use to construct a
new verifiable BQC protocol based on a new class of resource states. We rigorously prove
that the probability of failing to detect an incorrect output is exponentially small in a security
parameter, while resource overhead remains polynomial in this parameter. The new resource
state allows entangling gates to be performed between arbitrary pairs of logical qubits with only
constant overhead. This is a significant improvement on the original scheme, which required
that all computations to be performed must first be put into a nearest neighbour form, incurring
linear overhead in the number of qubits. Such an improvement has important consequences for
efficiency and fault-tolerance thresholds.
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1 Introduction
Scalable quantum computing has proven extremely difficult to achieve, and when the technology
to build large scale quantum computers does become available it is likely that they will appear
initially in small numbers at a handful of centers. How will a user interface securely with such a
quantum computer? A solution to this problem is offered by blind quantum computing (BQC),
which enables a classical client (Alice) with limited quantum technology to delegate a computation
to the quantum server(s) (Bob) in such a way that the privacy of the computation is preserved
[16, 4, 9, 2, 45, 10].
Blind classical computing (the notion of “computing with encrypted data”) was proposed by
Feigenbaum [24] and then extended by Abadi, Feigenbaum and Killian in a client server setting [1].
They showed that a randomized classical polynomial time client can encrypt and delegate general
instances of certain problems in NP1 to a powerful but untrusted server. Remarkably, they also
proved that the decision of no NP-hard function can be encrypted in this way if unconditional
security is required,2 unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level. The idea of com-
puting known circuits on encrypted data, while requiring the encryption and decryption procedures
be independent of the complexity of the function to be evaluated, was introduced earlier by Rivest,
Adleman and Dertouzous in a scenario restricted to computational security [46] shortly after the
invention of RSA [47]. The problem of creating such a scheme, known as fully homomorphic en-
cryption, remained open for 30 years before being settled by Gentry in 2009 [26], leading to one of
the most active areas of research in modern cryptography [51] 3.
The first example of blind quantum computation was proposed by Childs [16] based on the idea
of encrypting input qubits with a quantum one-time pad [3, 8]. At each step, the client sends the
encrypted qubits to the server, which applies a known quantum gate. Finally, the server returns
the quantum state for the client to decrypt with their key. Cycling through a fixed set of universal
gates ensures that the server learns nothing about the circuit. The next quantum blind protocol
with the possibility of detecting a cheating server was proposed by Arrighi and Salvail [4]. In their
scheme, the client gives the server multiple quantum inputs, most of which are decoys (not intended
to be part of the desired computation), but rather are used to detect the server’s deviation. This
leads to a trade-off on the server side between gaining information and not disturbing the system,
and achieves cheat-sensitive security against individual attacks for a set of classical functions called
random verifiable, where it is possible for the client to efficiently generate random input-output
pairs. Extending these results, together with Broadbent, we presented the first universal blind
quantum computing (UBQC) protocol [9] in the measurement-based model [42, 20], where the only
requirement for the client is a classical computing machine and a very weak quantum instrument, a
random single qubit generator, a currently available technology as we have demonstrated recently
[7]. Aside from the cryptographic scenario, a scheme based on a quantum authentication protocol4
was proposed by Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban [2], showing that any language in BQP has an
interactive proof system with a verifier accessing a constant-size quantum computer. This work
was complemented by a recent groundbreaking result of Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani on the
1A problem is in the class NP if one can verify its answers efficiently; it is NP-hard if it is as hard as any problem
in NP.
2A crypto system is unconditionally (computationally) secure if it is secure even when the adversary has unlimited
(restricted) computing power.
3While several attempts have been made in recent years to find homomorphic encryption schemes which allow for
the evaluation of certain quantum operations [48, 50, 11, 40], a quantum analogue of fully homomorphic encryption
remains elusive [52].
4The parties aim to communicate messages over an untrusted channel in such a way that the receiver can authen-
ticate the sender.
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command of quantum systems via rigidity of CHSH games [45], leading to further work on device
independent verifiable blind quantum computing [28, 30].
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the topic of blind quantum computing. This
includes, for example, the extension of measurement-based UBQC to various setting [35, 49, 36,
35, 38, 32], addressing key questions regarding the effect of the noise [37, 15], the creation of
new protocols to optimize communications requirements [29, 33, 41], the development of privacy
amplification techniques, similar to those applicable to quantum key distribution, to combat the
adverse effect of imperfect devices on blindness [23], experimental demonstrations [7, 25, 6], and
new cryptographic applications [39, 10].
A desirable property for any UBQC protocol is verifiability, whereby the client has a mechanism
to verify the correctness of a delegated computation. The motivation for this stems from the broad
range of computations which can be performed on a quantum computer. For problems which are
in NP, the solution can be efficiently verified, at least in principle, using a witness. However, for
other problems which can be efficiently computed using quantum computation, such as quantum
simulation [27], a dishonest server cannot be detected in such a way. The ability to compute
with encrypted data, while hiding the underlying function, has opened up new approaches to the
problem of verification [9, 2, 45]. The main contributions of the present paper are to make rigorous
the foundations of measurement-based UBQC and to present a new verification protocol which we
prove to be secure against the most general adversarial behavior of the server. Using this protocol,
the client can verify with high probability whether Bob has followed the instructions of the protocol
and the output state is indeed in the correct form, or if there has been a deviation resulting in
an incorrect output state. The central idea is based on the insertion of randomly prepared single
qubits (called traps), blindly isolated from the actual computation, which can act as such a witness.
Here, even the computation of the test (measurement of the qubits) can be performed blindly by
an untrusted server as we have demonstrated recently [6].
The verification scheme we present here makes use of similar elements as suggested in [9]: trap
computations are used to detect errors, and a fault-tolerant encoding of the computation is used to
amplify the detection rate. While the proof sketch for the effectiveness of verification in the original
UBQC paper did not consider the most general adversary, we prove that the modified scheme we
present here detects or corrects any possible deviation by the server, except with probability which
is exponentially suppressed. In order to do so we introduce new universal resource states beyond
the original brickwork state introduced in [9]. The first such family is a simple modification of
the brickwork state which allows for the embedding of an arbitrary trap qubit, which leads to an
inverse polynomial probability of detecting a deviation from the computation. In order to achieve
a higher rate of detection, we introduce a second resource state which overcomes the locality
limitations inherant in the brickwork state. This allows for the inclusion of a polynomial number of
trap qubits and fault-tolerant implementation of the target computation based on the topological
scheme of Raussendorf, Harrington and Goyal [44]. Together, these two new features allow for the
probability of failing to detect or correct a deviation from the protocol to be made exponentially
small. In this work we deal only with the stand-alone security definitions, as composable secuity
follows from recent follow-up work by Dunjko et al [22].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 summarize various re-
quired concepts from measurement-based quantum computing and also the original UBQC scheme
presented in [9]. In order to construct our new verifiable UBQC protocol we first introduce the
concept of dummy qubits in Section 4, where we assume Alice now can prepare a qubit randomly
chosen not only in the equatorial plain, as in the original UBQC scheme, but also from the set
{|0〉 , |1〉}. The latter qubits are called dummy qubits as they have no effect on the actual underly-
ing computation. However, they permit the blind construction of isolated trap qubits in the state
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|+θ〉 as explained in Section 6 where the core concept of verification is introduced. In order to deal
with both universality and verification, in Section 5 we introduce two new resource state called the
cylinder brickwork and dotted-complete graph states. The use of this scheme is expected to lead
to substantially increased thresholds for fault tolerant computing in the blind setting. A thresh-
old for fault-tolerant blind computation in the absence of verification based on this fault-tolerance
scheme was previously calculated as 4.3 × 10−3 by Morimae and Fujii [37]. As shown in Section
6, introduction of a single blind isolated trap qubit leads to a verifiable blind quantum computing
protocol with security polynomial in the total number of qubits. In order to boost the security
while maintaining universality a new scheme has to be constructed. This is done in Section 7 where
we put together various constructions of the previous sections to present the main result of this
paper, a universal exponentially-secure verifiable blind quantum computing protocol.
2 Preliminaries
Measurement-based quantum computing (MBQC) [42, 20] is a novel form of quantum information
processing, where the key twin notions that distinguish quantum information processing from its
classical counterpart, entanglement (creating non-local correlations between quantum elements) and
measurement (observing a quantum system), are the explicit driving force of computation. More
precisely, a measurement-based computation consists of a phase in which a collection of qubits are
set up in a standard entangled state. Measurements are then made on individual qubits and the
outcomes of the measurements may be used to determine further adaptive measurements. Finally,
again depending on measurement outcomes, local adaptive unitary operators, called corrections,
are applied to some qubits; this allows the elimination of the indeterminacy introduced by mea-
surements. Conceptually MBQC separates the quantum and classical aspects of computation; thus
it clarifies, in particular, the interplay between classical control and the quantum evolution process.
The UBQC protocol explores this unique feature of MBQC as it has been proven to be conceptually
enlightening to reason about distributed computing tasks using this approach [34]. We begin by
describing all the required elements for an MBQC protocol and then move to the particular family
of distributed MBQC protocols for hiding various aspects of a given computation.
2.1 Single party (undistributed) MBQC protocol
A formal language to describe in a compact way the operations needed for the MBQC model was
proposed in [20]. In this framework every MBQC algorithm (usually referred to as an MBQC pat-
tern) involves a sequence of operations such as entangling gates, measurements and feed-forwarding
of outcome results to determine further measurement bases. A measurement pattern, or simply a
pattern, is defined by a choice of a set of working qubits (V ), a subset of input qubits (I), another
subset of output qubits (O), and a finite sequence of commands acting on qubits in V . Therefore,
we consider patterns associated with the so-called open graphs.
Definition 1. An open graph is a triplet (G, I,O), where G = (V,E) is a undirected graph, and
I,O ⊆ V are respectively called input and output vertices.
Following the terminology of [20], a single party MBQC protocol consists of three elements:
1. A uniform family of open graph states {(Gn,m, In, On)}n over m vertices associated with in-
dividual qubits, where n is the size of the input/output space of the underlying computation.
In this paper we deal only with those MBQC protocol that implements a unitary operator
over their input space and hence the size of the output space is the same as the input space,
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but this is not a restriction and we can extend this treatment to any general completely pos-
itive trace preserving map by padding the input and output spaces. Further, for simplicity,
we will assume that the input is always a pure state, though again this treatment can be
extended to the general case. We usually assume that |I| = |O| = n, however sometime
n is taken to be strictly larger than the dimension of the input/output Hilbert space due
to the existence of auxiliary input or output qubits (as in later protocols which incorporate
trap qubits). In order to have uniform notation, for the latter case, we will still use I/O
to be the class of all non-prepared/non-measured qubits where it is strictly larger than the
class of all input/output qubits. By the term “uniform family” we simply mean that for any
protocol there exist a classical Turing machine that for a given input of the size n describes
the required graph over m ≥ n vertices. If the underlying geometry of the graph is regular,
for example being one-dimensional lines, two-dimensional regular lattices or brickwork graphs
(as we describe later), then instead of referring to the Turing machine to define the uniform
family we simply use fixed parameters such as the size of the line or lattice to specify the
graphs. For any fixed input size n the graph Gn,m describes the initial quantum state of the
protocol. Given an arbitrary state of the input qubits corresponding to the input vertices of
the graph, one prepares m − n qubits in the state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) corresponding to all
non-input qubits (Ic) in the graph and then apply ctrl-Z operator between qubits i and j,
if the corresponding vertices in Gn,m are connected. Note that since the ctrl-Z gate is sym-
metric the direction of the edge is not important and hence we are working with undirected
graphs. We will usually refer to the obtained quantum state based on the graph Gn,m as the
graph state Gn,m, unless a different notation is more appropriate, also for simplicity we drop
the indices.
2. A set of angles φi ∈ A where A ⊆ [0, 2pi) for all non-output qubits, to describe a collection
of single qubit (X,Y )-measurements, that is measurement in the bases 1√
2
(|0〉± eiφi |1〉). For
the specific class of MBQC protocols that we discuss in this paper we require the angles to
specify a collection of measurement bases, such that individual measurements are unbiased
with respect to the initial state. This is an essential ingredient for the blindness property
that we define later. Without loss of generality, we can fix the set from which the angles are
chosen to be A = {0, pi/4, 2pi/4, · · · , 7pi/4}. We will discuss later how this combination of
angles and particular families of graph states leads to approximate universality.
3. The last ingredient is the structure of the dependency among the measurements. It is known
that despite the probabilistic nature of the measurements, an MBQC protocol can implement
a unitary computation over the input space by introducing a casual structure over the mea-
surements. This is done by allowing any measurement on qubit i to be dependent on the
result of some (possibly none) previously measured qubits. Let si ∈ {0, 1} be the classical
result of the measurement at qubit i. There are two type of dependencies, called X and Z de-
pendency. If a measurement at qubit i is X or Z dependent on the sj where qubit j has been
already measured then the actual angle of the measurement of qubit i during the protocol run
is (−1)sjφi or φi + sjpi respectively. Naturally one needs a non-cyclic structure to be able to
run such dependencies and for an arbitrary graph such construction (if it exists) is formalized
by the notion of the flow of the graph [18, 13]. Intuitively, flow captures the propagation
of quantum information as the resource state is measured, identifying the locations where
measurement-dependent corrections should be made (see Figure 1). A flow is defined by a
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function (f : Oc → Ic) from the measured qubits to non-input qubits and a partial order ()
over the vertices of the graph such that ∀i : i  f(i) and ∀j ∈ NG(i) : f(i)  j, where NG(i)
denotes the neighborhood of vertex i in G. Each qubit k is X dependent on f−1(k) and Z
dependent on all qubits l such that k ∈ NG(f(l)). Note that if the dependency set is empty,
that is there is no qubit q such that q = f−1(k) or q ∈ NG(f(l)) then we set the convention
that the corresponding value of sq is zero and hence we can use the same formulas ((−1)sjφi
or φi + sjpi) to compute the dependent angles. For a given graph, once the input and output
qubits have been labeled, the flow, if it exists, is uniquely determined.
Figure 1: An open graph state with flow. The boxed vertices are the output (non-measured)
qubits and the circular vertices are the measured qubits. The flow function is represented as arrows
(representing the X dependency between measured qubits) and the partial order on the vertices
(measurement order) is given by the dotted partition sets. One can see easily how the flow highlights
the underlying circuit implemented by the measurement pattern.
The above describes only a non-distributed (single party) MBQC protocol, that is a protocol
where a party both prepares the graph state and performs the sequence of the dependent measure-
ments according to the order given by the flow (see [42, 20] for more details on MBQC computation).
One can easily extend the above definition to the distributed setting where different elements of
the protocol are accessible and known only to specific parties and through classical/quantum com-
munication the parties collaborate to perform a specific computation. Consider a simple two-party
example where Alice has the information about the angles and Bob has the information about the
graph and hence he can calculate the flow. Then they can collaborate to perform the corresponding
computation as follows: first Bob prepares the required graph state and asks Alice to send him the
classical information about the angles of the measurement, Bob then computes the dependency and
performs the measurement and so forth. The purpose of this paper is to describe a family of such
distributed protocols where, despite the communication, Alice can keep the measurement angles
hidden from Bob. We then show that, for certain carefully chosen graph families, hiding these
angles is sufficient to hide the full underlying computation together with the input and outputs.
2.2 2-Party (distributed) Hiding Protocols
We define a specific family of two-party (Alice and Bob) MBQC protocols (which we term hiding
protocols) that can be shown to be “blind” in the sense that Alice can hide information from Bob.
For simplicity, instead of working with a family of graphs representing the computation over an
arbitrary size input, we fix the input size to be n and we denote by m ≥ n the total number of
vertices in the graph and hence the total number of qubits in the equivalent single-party protocol.
Note that if we desire to have an efficient protocol, then we restrict the computation of the protocol
to be of the polynomial size by requiring that m = Poly(n). However blindness is independent of
any complexity assumptions so we do not, in general, restrict the size of m.
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The protocol will be interactive having m− n steps if the output is quantum or m steps if the
output is classical, where at each step a single qubit is measured. In practice we can parallelize the
protocol to D steps, where D is the depth of the partial order of the flow of the graph [12, 14]. This
is due to the special structure of the partial order of the qubits defined by the flow function whereby
all the qubit in the same class of the partial order are independent of each other and hence can be
measured in parallel, i.e. at the same time. However this parallelization will make no difference to
the concept of blindness that we are concerned with, so we keep the simple convention that at each
step only one qubit is measured. Furthermore we assume for the case of classical output that all of
the output qubits are measured in the final step with a Pauli X measurement. Again this is simply
a convention for the discussion in our paper and in general the output qubits could be measured
with any angles and in different steps depending on the flow construction. Such a convention
does not affect universality, as the circuit being implemented can simply be modified to replace
measurements in arbitrary bases with measurements in fixed bases preceded by an appropriate local
rotation.
We will denote by s a sequence of length m− n with value in {0, 1} describing the result of the
non-output measurements performed so far. In the case of classical output, where output qubits are
measured as the last n steps, s is a sequence of length m. The value associated with a qubit that is
not yet measured are set to 0, and hence at the beginning of the protocol before any measurement
being performed we set s = 0, 0, · · · , 0. We will denote by s≤i the prefix of length i of s and elements
of s are denoted by si. Whenever adding the values of si and sj we define their sum modulo 2.
All the qubits in the protocol are enumerated in such a way that at position i all qubits with label
less than i are measured before measuring qubit i. Any total ordering of the qubits consistent with
partial ordering of the flow will work and as a result the measurement at qubit i will depend only
on the string s<i .
We describe first a generic hiding protocol with quantum input and output (Protocol 1) and
one with classical input and output (Protocol 2) and then formalize various derivatives of them
to obtain universal, blind and verifiable protocols. Protocol 2 is exactly the same as Protocol 1
except that the steps for encoding input are removed and all the output qubits are measured in the
Pauli X basis. We retain the common text between the protocols so that they can be understood
individually. Note that the reason we chose the measurement of the output qubits to be in the
Pauli X basis is purely for simplicity of presentation, so that the same evaluation function C of the
non-output measurements, in Protocol 1, can be used for the output qubits. However one could add
separate evaluation function for the output qubit measurement to perform Pauli Z measurement
over them.
The outline of the main protocol is as follows. Alice has in mind a unitary operator U that is
implemented with a measurement pattern on some graph state G with its unique flow function f ,
and measurements angles in A = {0, pi/4, 2pi/4, · · · , 7pi/4}. This pattern could have been designed
either directly within the MBQC framework or via translation from a circuit construction. The
pattern assigns a measurement angle φi to each qubit in G, however during the execution of
the pattern, the actual measurement angle φ′i is a modification of φi that depends on previous
measurement outcomes instructed by f in the following way [18, 13]:
φ′i = (−1)sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j: i∈NG(f(j))
sjpi .
As said before, in a standard MBQC pattern all the non-input qubits are prepared in the state
|+〉 and all the input qubits in the desired input state |I〉. Considering such quantum input allows
for the possibility of Alice having additional capabilities allowing her to produce arbitrary input
states, or for the possibility that the input state is supplied on Alice’s behalf by a third party.
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In our protocols, in order to hide the information about the angles some randomness has to be
added to the preparation and consequently the measurements have to be adjusted to compensate for
this initial randomness to obtain the correct outcome. This randomisation has three components:
• A set of random angles θ used to hide the true measurement angles φ,
• A set of random bits r used to hide measurement outcomes,
• A set of random bits x used, along with θ, to hide any quantum input via a one-time pad.
Alice prepares all the non-input qubits in |+θi〉 = 1√2(|0〉+eiθi |1〉) for some randomly chosen θi ∈ A
and also applies a modified version of a full quantum one-time pad encryption over the input qubits
using random keys xi ∈ {0, 1} and θi ∈ A in the following way:
|e〉 = Xx11 Z1(θ1)⊗ . . .⊗Xxnn Zn(θn) |I〉 ,
before sending all qubits to Bob. After that, Bob entangles qubits according to G. Note that
this unavoidably reveals upper bounds on the dimensions of the underlying quantum computation,
corresponding to the length of the input and depth of the computation. The computation stage
involves interaction: for each qubit, Alice sends Bob a classical message δi ∈ A to tell him in which
basis (in the (X,Y ) plane) he should measure the qubit. This angle is computed in such a way as
to correct for the one-time padding of the input qubits and the random rotation of the non-input
qubits, as follows:
δi = (−1)xi+sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j: i∈NG(f(j))
sjpi + θi + ripi ,
where the last term ripi, with a randomly chosen ri ∈ {0, 1}, is added to hide the correct classical
outcome of the measurement from Bob without affecting the overall computation (see correctness
proof below). Bob then performs the measurement and communicates the outcome bi to Alice.
Alice’s choice of angles in future rounds will depend on these values, hence she will correct the
obtained outcome by setting si := bi ⊕ ri. If Alice is computing a classical function, the protocol
finishes when all qubits are measured (Protocol 2), as the classical outputs are encoded in the
measurement outcomes sent to Alice. If she is computing a quantum function, Bob returns to her
the final qubits (Protocol 1), and it is taken that the quantum output is encoded in these qubits.
Note that in Protocol 2 we take the input to be |+〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+〉, an encoding of the fixed classical
input 0 · · · 0, any other arbitrary classical input i1 · · · in is prepared by applying appropriate Z on
the corresponding qubit to create
|e〉 = Zi11 ⊗ . . .⊗ Zinn (|+θ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+θn〉) .
For classical input there is no need for a full one-time padding of the input hence no need for the
xi random variables as θi rotation completely hides the input. The above explanation is the basis
for the correctness of all of the protocols presented in this paper.
Definition 2. A hiding protocol with quantum input is correct if the quantum output state is U |I〉
or if the classical outputs are the result of Pauli X measurements on the state U |I〉, where U is
the unitary operator corresponding to the implementation of the measurement pattern of the hiding
protocol. Similarly one could define correctness for protocols with classical input.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Assume Alice and Bob follow the steps of Protocols 1 and 2. Then the
outcome is correct.
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Proof. The correctness of these protocol follows from the correctness of standard measurement
based quantum computation [20], as we now show. We explicitly give a proof only for the case of
quantum input and output, as the remaining cases have virtually identical proofs. The protocol
deviates in three ways from the standard implementation of the desired measurement pattern
defined by a graph state G with measurement angles φi: a random Z(θi) rotation over all qubits;
a random Xxi rotation over the input qubits; measuring with angles δi. However, since ctrl-Z
commutes with Z-rotations, Alice’s preparation does not change the underlying graph state; only
the phase of each qubit is locally changed, and it is as if Bob had done the Z-rotation after the
ctrl-Z. Let φ′i be the adapted angles of the measurement φi according to the flow structure of
the desired measurement pattern defined by G. Note that a measurement in the {|+φ′i〉, |−φ′i〉}
basis on a state |ψ〉 is the same as a measurement in the {|+φ′i+θi〉, |−φ′i+θi〉} basis on Z(θi) |ψ〉.
Also a measurement in the {|+φ′i〉, |−φ′i〉} basis on a state |ψ〉 is the same as a measurement in the{|+−φ′i〉, |−−φ′i〉} basis on X |ψ〉. Finally since δi = (−1)xiφ′i+θi+piri, if ri = 0, Bob’s measurement
has the same effect as Alice’s target measurement; if ri = 1, all Alice needs to do is to flip the
outcome. Therefore all the deviation from the actual implementation of the measurement pattern
are corrected and the quantum output is the desired state corresponding to the action of the unitary
operator implemented by the graph state G over the input state.
Note that in practice if Alice has the description of a unitary V such that V (⊗i |+〉) = |I〉
then trivially a hiding protocol that blindly computes UV over the input states ⊗i |+〉 will prepare
the desired output state of the form U |I〉. Therefore for such a scenario Alice can follow the step
of the Protocol 1 with classical input without having to prepare the encoded state Xx11 Z1(θ1) ⊗
. . .⊗Xxnn Zn(θn) |I〉 herself. However, we have presented the full protocol for an arbitrary, possibly
unknown, quantum input state, since the general scheme proved useful for dealing with input
supplied by a third party [39].
3 Blindness
We say a hiding protocol is blind if Bob cannot tell anything relating to the angles of measurements.
In considering this it is worth noting that Bob can run the protocol only once with fixed values for
Alice’s parameters φi, θi, ri, xi. Later we will show how for generic graphs this will lead to hiding
the output of the computation as well. Following the convention of [1], we use the notation of a
leakage function, denoted as L(X), to formalize what Bob learns during the interaction. We present
a stand alone security definition that is equivalent to the original definition of blindness provided
in [9].
Definition 3. A hiding protocol P with input X is blind while leaking at most L(X) if the distri-
bution of messages obtained by Bob in P is dependent only on L(X).
Theorem 2 (Blindness). Protocol 1 is blind while leaking at most G and n, and 2 is blind while
leaking at most G.
Proof. We first give a proof for the blindness of Protocol 1. We show that given G and n, and in-
dependent of the actions of Bob, the message registers he receives are always in a maximally mixed
state. We begin by introducing a new variable θ′i = θi + ripi, for all i. Thus, any quantum input re-
ceived by Bob during a run of the protocol is given by |e〉 = Xx11 Zr11 Z1(θ′1)⊗. . .⊗Xxnn Zrnn Zn(θ′n) |I〉,
while the remaining qubits he receives are in states |+θ′i+ripi〉 for n < i ≤ m. Expressed in terms of
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θ′i, δi becomes independent of ri for all i, since
δi = (−1)sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j: i∈NG(f(j))
sjpi + θ
′
i.
Thus, only the ith qubit received by Bob is dependent on ri, and so tracing over the secret values r
simply dephases every qubit in the computational basis. Similarly, only qubit i is dependent on xi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and so tracing over x completes the depolarization of the quantum input. Thus every
qubit received by Bob is in the maximally mixed state, and uncorrelated with all other qubits.
Next consider the classical communication used to convey measurement angles during the pro-
tocol. The computation of δi is composed of three terms. The first two terms, (−1)sf−1(i)φi and∑
j: i∈NG(f(j)) sjpi, may depend implicitly on bk and δk for k < i, and on r and x. However, note
that the communication received up to Step i is independent of θ′i, the third term of δi. Since θ
′
i
is uniformly random over A, δi must also be uniformly random and uncorrelated with previous
communication sent to Bob. Thus, all communication in the protocol is uniformly random and
uncorrelated, once the random keys (x, r, θ) are traced out, independent of the actions of Bob. An
identical argument holds for Protocol 2, except that all m qubits are assigned measurements, and
hence n is not revealed.
We note that the above definition is equivalent to a simulator based definition, since once L(X)
is fixed, the distribution of messages Bob receives is also fixed. Hence, Alice could be replaced by
a simulator with access only to L(X), and this substitution could not be detected by Bob. A more
detailed treatment of simulator based definitions and composable security can be found in [22].
4 Dummy Qubits
In order to obtain an intuitive method for achieving verification, we construct an extension of
Protocol 1 where Alice can also prepare qubits in the state |z〉 where z is chosen uniformly at
random from {0, 1}. These qubits are called dummy qubits, as they will not be part of actual
computation. A dummy qubit remains disentangled from the rest of the qubits of the graph state
and, as we prove later, the addition of these dummy qubits does not affect the correctness or
blindness of the hiding protocol. These dummy qubits are measured with random angles which
again will not affect the actual computation due to the fact that they are disentangled from the
rest of the qubits. However, as we demonstrate in the next section, these dummy qubits allow
Alice to easily create isolated trap qubits within the resource state to enable verification of the
computation. Note that Alice must keep the position of the dummy qubits hidden from Bob (i.e.
part of the secret) in order to keep the position of any trap qubits hidden. The addition of the
dummy qubits can also be viewed as a method for the blind implementation of the Pauli Z basis
measurements. This is due to the fact that their position is hidden from Bob and from his point of
view they are measured in the (X,Y ) plane as well. However due to their preparation state (|0〉 or
|1〉) through the entangling step, they have the same effect of measuring the corresponding qubit
in the Pauli Z basis. Therefore, we use the term blind Pauli Z measurement interchangeably with
dummy qubits in the rest of the paper. Due to the addition of dummy qubits, we will assume from
now on that n is an upper bound over the number of the input or output qubits. This is required to
allow the possibility of having hidden trap or dummy qubits as part of the input or output system.
Therefore in the design of the measurement pattern, auxiliary qubits are added to the input and
output space in such a way that the actual computation remains intact.
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Protocol 1 Generic Hiding Protocol with Quantum Input and Output
• Alice’s resources
– Graph G over m vertices where labeling of vertices are in such a way that the first n qubits
are input and the last n qubits are output.
– An n-qubit input state |I〉.
– A sequence of non-output measurement angles, φ = (φi)1≤i≤(m−n) with φi ∈ A.
– m random variables θi with values taken uniformly at random from A.
– n random variables xi and m−n random variables ri with values taken uniformly at random
from {0, 1}.
– A fixed function CG that for each non-output qubit i (1 ≤ i ≤ m− n) computes the angle
of the measurement of qubit i to be sent to Bob. This function depends on φi, θi, ri, xi and
the result of the measurements that have been performed so far (s<i). The function CG also
depends on the flow (f,) of the graph G. However, since the flow of the graph G is unique
(if it exists), we need not take flow as a parameter of the function CG. We have
CG : {1, · · · , (m− n)} ×A×A× {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}m−n → A
(i, φi, θi, ri, xi, s) 7→ (−1)xi+sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j: i∈NG(f(j)) sjpi + θi + ripi
where xk for n+ 1 ≤ k ≤ m and also sk for any non-defined value of k is set to zero.
• Initial Step
– Alice’s move: Alice sends Bob the graph G and sets all the values in s to be 0. Next she
sends m qubits in the order of the labeling of the vertices of the graph, as follows: first, Alice
encodes the n-qubit input state as
|e〉 = Xx11 Z1(θ1)⊗ . . .⊗Xxnn Zn(θn) |I〉
and sends them as the first n qubits to Bob. She then prepares m − n single qubits in the
state |+θi〉 (n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m) and sends them to Bob as the remaining qubits.
– Bob’s move: Bob receives m single qubits and entangles them according to G.
• Step i : 1 ≤ i ≤ (m− n)
– Alice’s move: Alice computes the angle δi = CG(i, φi, θi, ri, xi, s) and sends it to Bob.
– Bob’s move: Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the result bi.
– Alice’s move: Alice sets the value of si in s to be bi ⊕ ri.
• Step i : m− n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– Bob’s move: Bob sends qubit i to Alice.
– Alice’s move: Alice applies X
sf−1(i)Z
∑
j: i∈NG(f(j)) sjZ(θi) over qubit i.
Theorem 3. Assume Alice and Bob follow the steps of Protocol 3. Then the outcome obtained is
the same as if the computation took place over the graph G after removal of the dummy vertices in
D, the set of positions of dummy qubits in G.
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Protocol 2 Generic Hiding Protocol with Classical Input and Output
• Alice’s resources
– Graph G over m vertices where labeling of vertices are in such a way that the first n qubits
are input and the last n qubits are output.
– An n-bit input string c1, . . . , cn.
– A sequence of non-output measurement angles, φ = (φi)1≤i≤(m−n) with φi ∈ A.
– m random variables θi with values taken uniformly at random from A.
– m random variables ri with values taken uniformly at random from {0, 1}.
– A fixed function CG that for each non output qubit i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) computes the angle of
the measurement of qubit i to be sent to Bob:
CG : {1, · · · ,m} ×A×A× {0, 1} × {0, 1}m → A
(i, φi, θi, ri, s) 7→ (−1)sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j: i∈NG(f(j)) sjpi + θi + ripi
where sk for any non-defined value of k is set to zero, also φi = 0 for m− n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
• Initial Step
– Alice’s move: Alice sends Bob the graph G and sets all the value in s to be 0. Next she
sends m qubits in the order of the labeling of the vertices of the graph, as follows: first, Alice
encodes the n-bit string classical input c1, . . . , cn as state
|e〉 = Zc11 ⊗ . . .⊗ Zcnn (|+θ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+θn〉) = |+θ1+i1pi〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+θn+inpi〉
and sends them as the first n qubits to Bob. She then prepares m − n single qubits in the
state |+θi〉 (n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m) and sends them to Bob as the remaining qubits.
– Bob’s move: Bob receives m single qubits and entangles them according to G.
• Step i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m – Alice’s move: Alice computes the angle δi = CG(i, φi, θi, ri, s) and
sends it to Bob.
– Bob’s move: Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the result bi.
– Alice’s move: Alice sets the value of si in s to be bi ⊕ ri.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the only new element is the effect of the
dummy qubits. If a dummy qubit is in the state |0〉 then in the entangling step this qubit does
not affect the state of the other qubits. However, if the dummy qubit is in the state |1〉 then the
entangling operation will introduce a Pauli Z rotation on all the neighboring qubits in G. Hence
a qubit i 6∈ D will be affected by the operator ∏j∈NG(i)∩D Zdj . In the initial step, Alice already
applied the operation
∏
j∈NG(i)∩D Z
dj over the prepared qubits and therefore all qubits i 6∈ D are
in the desired state |+θi〉, since Z operator is self-inverse. Moreover all the dummy qubits are
unentangled with the rest of qubits and are measured in a random basis with no consequences for
the part of the computation taking place over the graph G after removing vertices D.
Theorem 4. The hiding protocol with dummy qubits, Protocol 3, is blind while leaking at most G.
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Protocol 3 Generic Hiding Protocol with Quantum Input and Output and Dummy Qubits
• Alice’s resources
– Graph G over m vertices where labeling of vertices are in such a way that all the l input
qubits are located among the first n ≥ l qubits and all the l output qubits are located among
the last n qubits.
– An l-qubit input state |I〉.
– The dummy qubits positions, set D, chosen among all possible vertices except the l input
and l output qubits.
– A sequence of non-output measurement angles, φ = (φi)1≤i≤(m−n) with φi ∈ A where φi = 0
for all i ∈ D.
– m random variables θi with values taken uniformly at random from A.
– l random variables xi, m− n random variables ri and |D| random variables di with values
taken uniformly at random from {0, 1}.
– A fixed function CG that for each non output qubit i (1 ≤ i ≤ m− n) computes the angle
of the measurement of qubit i to be sent to Bob:
CG : {1, · · · , (m− n)} ×A×A× {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}m−n → A
(i, φi, θi, ri, xi, s) 7→ (−1)xi+sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j: i∈NG(f(j)) sjpi + θi + ripi
where xk for n+ 1 ≤ k ≤ m and sk for any non-defined value of k are set to zero.
• Initial Step
– Alice’s move: Alice sends Bob the graph G and sets all the value in s to be 0. Alice
encodes the l-qubit input state as
|e〉 = Xx11 Z1(θ1)⊗ . . .⊗Xxln Zn(θl) |I〉
and positions them among the first n qubits. She then prepares the remaining qubits in the
following form
∀i ∈ D |di〉
∀i 6∈ D ∏j∈NG(i)∩D Zdj |+θi〉 = ∣∣∣+θi+∑j∈NG(i)∩D djpi〉
Then Alice sends Bob all m qubits in the order of the labeling of the vertices of the graph.
– Bob’s move: Bob receives m single qubits and entangles them according to G.
• Step i : 1 ≤ i ≤ (m− n)
– Alice’s move: Alice computes the angle δi = CG(i, φi, θi, ri, s) and sends it to Bob.
– Bob’s move: Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the result bi.
– Alice’s move: Alice sets the value of si in s to be bi ⊕ ri.
• Step i : m− n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– Bob’s move: Bob sends qubit i to Alice.
– Alice’s move: Alice applies X
sf−1(i)Z
∑
j: i∈NG(f(j)) sjZ(θi) to qubit i.
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Proof. Proof follows along similar lines of Theorem 2. We define θ′i = θi + piri + pi
∑
j∈NG(i)∩D di.
Alice’s total communication to Bob consists of the initial quantum states, which we can rewrite
as |+θ′i−piri〉 if the qubit is not a dummy qubit or ∈R {|0〉 , |1〉} if it is a dummy qubit, and the
measurement angles which are set to be δi = φ
′
i + θ
′
i − pi
∑
j∈NG(i)∩D di. As before, the values of δi
are uniformly random since θ′i are uniformly random, and for any fixed values of δi tracing over all
ri, we obtain the initial quantum state for each qubit as either
1
2
|+θ′i〉〈+θ′i |+
1
2
|−θ′i〉〈−θ′i | =
I
2
if the qubit was not dummy, and
1
2
|0〉 〈0|+ 1
2
|1〉 〈1| = I
2
if the qubit was a dummy. Hence the qubits obtained by Bob are always in the maximally mixed
state and are not correlated with each other.
5 Universal Resource States
During a hiding protocol Bob learns the graph of entanglement, G, however it was shown in [9] that
it is possible for Alice to choose a family of graphs corresponding to what were termed brickwork
states such that blindness of the angles, as defined before, will permit Alice to hide the unitary
operator that the protocol is implementing, revealing only an upper bound on the dimensions of
the circuit required to implement it. The key element to achieve this is the use of those universal
resources for MBQC [21] that are generic, hence revealing no information about the structure of the
underlying computation, except the bounds on the size of input and the depth of the computation.
Moreover to make the protocol practical from Alice’s point, it is desirable to restrict the class
of measurement angles, so that the required class of random qubits prepared by Alice is also
restricted. Note that exact universal blind quantum computing could be achieved if Alice could
prepare separable single qubit states |+θ〉 with θ chosen randomly in [0, 2pi) and if Bob could make
any measurement with angles in [0, 2pi). Such a model requires Alice to communicate random real
angles to Bob, and hence such a setting is unattractive from a communications resources point of
view. Similar to the quantum circuit scenario, by the Solovay-Kitaev theorem, a finite set of angles
(for instance a set that corresponds to Hadamard and pi8 -Phase gates) can be used to efficiently
approximate any single qubit unitary operator.5 For the rest of this paper we will restrict our
attention to approximate universality and we use the fact that a large family of graph states are
approximately universal if one restricts the set of angles to be in the set {0,±pi/4,±pi/2} [19]. We
give two such examples below.
Definition 4. A brickwork state Gn×m, where m ≡ 5 (mod 8), is an entangled state of n × m
qubits constructed as follows:
1. Prepare all qubits in state |+〉 and assign to each qubit an index (i, j), i being a row (i ∈ [n])
and j being a column (j ∈ [m]).
2. For each row, apply the operator ctrl-Z on qubits (i, j) and (i, j + 1) where 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1.
5More precisely, the Solovay-Kitaev theorem states that if the subgroup generated by some subset of SU(2)
operators is dense in SU(2), then the approximation converges exponentially quickly to any element of SU(2) in the
number of these operators from a smaller set one uses to approximate.
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3. For each column j ≡ 3 (mod 8) and each odd row i, apply the operator ctrl-Z on qubits
(i, j) and (i+ 1, j) and also on qubits (i, j + 2) and (i+ 1, j + 2).
4. For each column j ≡ 7 (mod 8) and each even row i, apply the operator ctrl-Z on qubits
(i, j) and (i+ 1, j) and also on qubits (i, j + 2) and (i+ 1, j + 2).
We will refer to the underlying graph of a brickwork state as the brickwork graph and denote it with
the same notation as Gn×m, see Figure 2.
Figure 2: The brickwork state, G6×19. Qubits are arranged according to layer x and row y, corre-
sponding to the vertices in the above graph, and are originally in state |+〉. ctrl-Z gates are then
performed between qubits which are joined by an edge. A similar resource state was proposed in
[17].
Theorem 5 (Universality [9]). The brickwork state Gn×m is universal for quantum computa-
tion. Furthermore, we only require single-qubit measurements under the angles {0,±pi/4,±pi/2}
to achieve approximate universality, and measurements can be done layer-by-layer.
Proof. The proof is straightforward (see details in [9]) based on constructing measurement patterns
for elements of an approximate universal gates set that could be tiled together as a brickwork states
as depicted in Figures 3.
Let us denote vertices of a brickwork graph Gn×m by (i, j) (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m), then
it is easy to verify that the unique flow function of G is defined by:
fG((i, j)) = (i, j + 1)
That is to say, the flow of each vertex in the graph is from its immediate left neighbor in the same
row. The corresponding partial order ≺G is defined as the collection of sets Lj of all vertices in the
jth column of the brickwork graph
Lj = {(x, y)|1 ≤ x ≤ n, y = j}.
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Figure 3: Measurement patterns implementing arbitrary single qubit rotations and the CNOT
operator. These patterns can be composed within the brickwork state, as shown in the lower
portion of the figure.
Now suppose Alice has in mind a unitary operator U of size 2n × 2n and the n-qubit input state
|I〉. Due to Theorem 5 there exist an integer m and angles {φi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤m ∈ A such that the
measurement pattern with angles {φi,j} over the brickwork state Gn×m, where the first n qubit are
set to be in the state |I〉, approximates U |I〉. Therefore the last n qubits after the measurements
of the first m− n qubits and application of the corresponding corrections induced by flow are in a
state which can be made arbitrarily close to U |I〉. We can simply adapt the generic hiding protocol
to implement this measurement pattern blindly as presented in the [9].
As mentioned in Section 4, in order to construct a verification scheme we make use of dummy
qubits. While this presents a simple mechanism to achieve isolated trap qubits, the presence of
trap and dummy qubits disrupts the computation. However this can be fixed through a simple
modification of the brickwork state.
Definition 5. A cylinder brickwork state GCn×m is a modification of the brickwork state of size
n×m, for even n, where the first and the last rows are connected such that the regular brickwork
structure is preserved, while introducing rotational symmetry. We will refer to the underlying graph
of a cylinder brickwork state as the cylinder brickwork graph and denote it with the same notation
as GCn×m (see Figure 4). A tape, Ti in a cylinder brickwork graph is the subgraph induced by all the
nodes of ith and (i+ 1)th rows.
The cylinder brickwork state allows for a simple construction for trap-based verification, as
discussed in Section 6. Next we introduce another generic family called dotted-complete graph
states which enables significant amplification of the probability of detecting deviations from the
computation, particularly in the case of quantum output, as discussed in Section 7. The basic idea
behind this new universal resource state is that it can be partitioned blindly into smaller universal
resource states, one of which will be used for the computation, while the others will be used as
traps for verification purposes (see later). To begin with, we need to introduce the graphs which
we will use, and prove that they have some special properties.
Definition 6. We define the operator ∼ (G) on graph G to be the operator which transforms a
graph G to a new graph denoted as G˜ by replacing every edge in G with a new vertex connected to
the two vertices originally joined by that edge. Let KN denote the complete graph of N vertices,
we call the quantum state corresponding to the graph K˜N the dotted-complete graph state denoted
with K˜N . We denote the set of vertices of K˜N previously inherited from KN as P (K˜N ), and denote
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Tape
Figure 4: Th cylinder brickwork state GC6×19.
the vertices added by the ∼ () operation by A(K˜N ). The number of the vertices in the K˜N graph is
then equal to N(N + 1)/2.
K4 K4
~
~
Figure 5: An example of the relationship between a complete graph K4 and the corresponding
dotted-complete graph K˜4. The vertices in black in K˜4 denote the set P (K˜4), while the white
vertices correspond to A(K˜4).
The next definition and lemmas will be used in manipulation of dotted-complete graph states.
Definition 7. We define the bridge operator on a vertex v of degree 2 on graph G to be the operator
which connects the two neighbors of v and then removes vertex v and any associated edges from G.
We define the break operator on a vertex v of graph G to be the operator which removes vertex v and
any associated edges from G. Let G be a graph on m vertices. Then we say that G is n-universal,
for n ≤ m, if and only if any graph of n vertices can be obtained from G through a sequence of
bridges and breaks.
Lemma 1. K˜N is N -universal, and the bridge and break operations used to obtain a target graph
need only be performed on vertices in A(K˜N ).
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Proof. Given any graph G on N vertices, associate each vertex ui in G with a vertex vi in P (K˜N ).
Each pair of vertices (vi, vj) in P (K˜N ) is connected through an intermediate vertex of degree 2
in A(K˜N ). Thus by bridging over the intermediate vertex if ui and uj are joined by an edge and
breaking the intermediate vertex otherwise, K˜N reduces to G. As this is true for all graphs G on
N vertices, K˜N is N -universal.
Lemma 2. Given a partitioning of the vertices P (K˜N ) into n sets {Pi} containing Ni vertices
respectively, by applying a sequence of break operations only, it is possible to transform K˜N into n
disconnected graphs k˜i such that each one of them are of the form K˜Ni and P (k˜i) = Pi.
Proof. As the vertices P (K˜N ) are associated with a corresponding vertex in KN , the vertices of
KN can by partitioned into the sets {Pi}. As KN is the complete graph the vertices within each
partition Pi form a clique. Thus by removing edges between the partitions the resulting graph is
composed of n disconnected graphs {ki = KNi} such that the vertices in ki are the vertices in Pi.
As removing an edge before applying the ∼ () operator is equivalent to applying a break operation
after the ∼ () operator there exists a corresponding sequence of break operations, such that the
resulting graph is ∼ ({ki}) = {k˜i}. As k˜i =∼ (ki), it follows that P (k˜i) = Pi and since ki = KNi
then k˜i = K˜Ni as required.
Lemma 3. Given a graph K˜N , by applying break operators to every vertex in P (K˜N ) or A(K˜N )
the resulting graph is composed of the vertices of A(K˜N ) or P (K˜N ) respectively and contains no
edges.
Proof. As the ∼ () operation only introduces vertices connected to vertices in P (K˜N ), every vertex
in A(K˜N ) shares edges only with vertices in P (K˜N ). Thus when the vertices in P (K˜N ) and their
associated edges are removed by the break operators, the vertices in A(K˜N ) become disconnected.
Similarly, since ∼ () removes all edges between vertices in P (K˜N ), hence every vertex in P (K˜N )
shares edges only with vertices in A(K˜N ). Thus when the vertices in A(K˜N ) and their associated
edges are removed by the break operators, the vertices in P (K˜N ) become disconnected.
We now extend these results to graph states.
Lemma 4. Given two graph states |ψG1〉 and |ψG2〉 corresponding to graphs G1 and G2 respectively,
if it is possible to obtain G2 from G1 through a sequence of bridge and break operations, then it is
possible to obtain |ψG2〉 from |ψG1〉 through a sequence of Pauli measurements and local rotations
about the Z axis through angles from the set {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 }.
Proof. By measuring any qubit in a graph state with Pauli Z operator, we obtain a state equivalent
up to local Pauli Z corrections to the graph state obtained from the graph when that vertex and
its associated edges are removed. To see this, we consider the operations this qubit undergoes:
It is first prepared in a state |+〉, then interacted with its neighbors via ctrl-Z gates, and then
measured in the Z basis. As the measurement commutes with the entangling operation, this result
is identical to the case where the ctrl-Z gates are applied to the measured eigenstate of Z. Thus
when the complete sequence of events is taken into account, this operation is equivalent to the
identity when the measurement outcome is 0, and equivalent to local Pauli Z operators applied to
the neighbors of the measured site when the measurement outcome is 1. This is then the graph
state equivalent of the break operation defined on the associated graph.
If a vertex is of degree 2, then measuring the associated qubit with the Pauli Y operator yields
the graph state corresponding to the graph obtained by applying a bridge operation to that vertex,
up to local Z-rotations through an angle ±pi2 . To see this, we again consider the sequence of
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operations the qubit undergoes: It is prepared in the state |+〉, interacted with its neighbors and
then measured in the Y basis. Immediately prior to measurement, the net operator applied is
1√
2
|0〉 ⊗ I+ 1√
2
|1〉 ⊗ Z1 ⊗ Z2, where the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the neighbors of the measured
qubit. Thus if the measurement result is 0 then this is equivalent to directly applying the operator
ei
pi
4
Z1⊗Z2 to the neighboring qubits, whereas if the measurement result is 1 this is equivalent to
applying the operator e−i
pi
4
Z1⊗Z2 to these qubits. Since the ctrl-Z gate can be written either as
ei
pi
4
(I−Z⊗I−I⊗Z+Z⊗Z) or e−i
pi
4
(I−Z⊗I−I⊗Z+Z⊗Z), the effect on the neighboring qubits is equivalent to
a ctrl-Z, up to local Z-rotations by pi2 (for a measurement result of 0) or −pi2 (for a measurement
result of 1). This could also be derived via the stabilizer formalism. For a more detailed discussion
of the effect of Pauli measurements in the measurement based model, the reader is referred to
[31].
Theorem 6 (Universality). The dotted-complete graph state K˜N is universal for quantum compu-
tation. Furthermore, we only require single-qubit measurements under the angles {0,±pi/4,±pi/2}
and in the Pauli Z basis to achieve approximate universality, and measurements can be done layer-
by-layer.
Proof. Due to lemmas 1 and 4, by choosing N big enough, we could construct the brickwork state
Gn×m from K˜N using only Pauli measurements. Hence from Theorem 5 we obtain the universality
of dotted-complete graph states and approximate universality with only single qubits measurements
under the angles {0,±pi/4,±pi/2} (which includes the Pauli Y measurements required to implement
bridge operations), and the Pauli Z basis measurements required to implement break operations.
From this result we can construct a new universal hiding protocol based on dotted-complete
graph states, as given in Protocol 4. Interestingly, in the case of classical input and output this new
protocol does not even reveal the circuit dimensions, but instead a single integer which is an upper
bound on the number of qubits required to implement the computation in the measurement-based
model.
Protocol 4 Dotted-Complete Graph State Universal Hiding Protocol with Quantum Input/Output
• Alice’s resources
– Parameter N such that the desired computation could be obtained from the state K˜N after
a sequence of break and bridge operators (Theorem 6). The labeling of vertices are in such a
way that the first n qubits are input and the last n qubits are output.
– The dummy qubits position, set D, is set to be the position of all the qubits that are
required to be Pauli Z measured for performing the break operators.
– A sequence of non-output measurement angles, φ = (φi)1≤i≤(m−n) with φi ∈ A where φi = pi2
for all i ∈ D and also for all the qubits that are required to be Pauli Y measured to perform
the bridge operators.
– The rest of the resources are the same as Protocol 3.
Follow the steps of Protocol 3 where G is replaced with K˜N .
Theorem 7. Protocol 4 is blind, while leaking at most n and N .
Proof. As Bob entangles according to K˜N , clearly the parameter N is leaked. Additionally, in the
case of quantum output, Bob must be instructed how many qubits to return to Alice, and hence
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knows n. However, fixing these parameters, due to Theorem 2 all the measurement angles including
the measurements for the bridge operators are blind to Bob. Similarly, from Theorem 4 we have
blindness for the measurement corresponding to the break operators. Together these guarantee
the blindness of the operations required to prepare a brickwork state from K˜N . Finally Theorem 2
proved the blindness of the remaining measurements performed on the prepared brickwork state.
6 Verification
This section deals with another property of the hiding protocol called verification. This property
requires that Alice can verify with high probability whether Bob has followed the instructions of
the protocol and hence if the quantum or classical output state is indeed in the correct form, or
whether there has been a deviation and she should therefore reject the output state. The main
idea is to exploit blindness so that Alice can expand the protocol to include trap qubits where Alice
knows in advance the classical outcome of these specific measurements (i.e. the correct message
from Bob for these measurements), where the blindness ensures that the position of these traps
remains hidden from Bob. At the end Alice will accept the quantum or classical output only if
Bob has produced all of the expected outcomes for these trap qubits measurements. The subtlety
in verification is to prove that the accepted quantum or classical output is indeed correct.
It is essential that Alice keeps the position of these trap qubits unknown to Bob, so that
he cannot attempt to interfere with the actual computation of U while keeping the trap qubits
untouched. We will present a protocol where every qubit of the underlying graph could potentially
be an isolated (unentangled) trap qubit in an unknown state |+θ〉 for θ ∈ A. In order to do so, it
is enough to prepare all the neighboring vertices of the trap qubit as dummy qubits, hence these
dummy qubits together with the trap qubits remain disentangled from the rest of the graph during
the preparation stage. Building on this simple construction, by adding more traps and adding error
detection elements, we will present a final protocol in which the probability of not detecting an
incorrect outcome is exponentially small.
In order to first demonstrate the main idea of this method of verification, we ignore the uni-
versality property and only later will we present a concrete universal blind quantum computing
protocol with the verification property. Hence to obtain a generic hiding protocol with a random
unknown trap it is sufficient to use Protocol 3, where Alice chooses a random position t to be an
isolated trap qubit (Protocol 5).
Protocol 5 Generic Hiding QC For Unitary with Dummy, Trap, Quantum Input and Output
• Alice’s resources
– Graph G over m vertices and a random position t among the vertices of G.
– The rest of the resources are the same as Protocol 3 where φi = 0 for i = t and i ∈ D where
D contains the set of all neighbors of position t in the original graph to create an isolated
trap qubit at position t.
• Follow the steps of Protocol 3.
• Accept/Reject
– After obtaining all the output qubits from Bob, if the trap qubit, t, is an output qubit,
Alice measures it with angle δt = θt + rtpi to obtain bt.
– Alice accepts if bt = rt.
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Theorem 4 directly implies that Protocol 5 is blind and the position of the trap qubits t remains
unknown to Bob. Recall that at each stage i only qubit i is measured. We present some interme-
diate definitions before formalizing the definition of verification. All the protocols presented so far
describe the expected behavior of Alice and Bob in a hiding protocol. Since we are concerned with
the secrecy of Alice’s resources we can assume that Alice always follows the steps of the protocol.
In fact after the initial step when Alice draws all the random variables θi and ri her behavior, for a
fixed run of the protocol, is deterministic. This means that at each step the next move of Alice is
determined completely by the past, however a malicious Bob might deviate in any way he desires.
We will define a run of protocol to be honest (Bob has behaved as expected) or correct (the output
is correct despite Bob’s deviations) based on the outcome of all measurements and the quantum
output state if it exists.
Recall that in a generic hiding protocol with quantum input and output the messages sent by
Bob to Alice depend on a collection of outcome measurements, si ∈ {0, 1}. In fact Bob will send
the outcome value bi and then Alice, depending on ri, will reset them to their corrected values si.
In what follows we will deal with the corrected outcome measurement that is si. Similarly at the
end of the protocol Bob will send Alice some quantum output state in the output Hilbert space
HO that needs to be corrected depending on all the measurements outcomes. In what follows we
consider the corrected quantum output state ρ. Note that the values of si and ρ depends on Alice’s
specific random choices and also Bob’s general strategy of deviation. We treat this information as a
single density operator to deal uniformly with both classical and quantum output. Finally in order
to consider the most general deviation that Bob can perform during a run of protocol we consider
a collection of unitary operators acting each at a stage of the protocol on the private qubits of Bob
and all the other qubits and classical bits sent by Alice to Bob.
Definition 8. Consider a particular run of a generic hiding protocol, where all the following
parameters are fixed: Alice’s angles of measurements φ = (φi)1≤i≤(m−n); Alice’s random vari-
ables x = (xi)1≤i≤n, r = (ri)1≤i≤(m−n), θ = (θi)1≤i≤m and d = (di)i∈D; Alice’s input state |I〉;
The number of Bob’s private qubits B; Bob’s deviation unitaries at each stage of the protocol
U = {Ui}0≤i≤m+1 acting on all quantum and classical messages. We denote the outcome density
operator (of all classical and quantum messages sent by Bob to Alice) as follows:
Bj(ν) =
∑
~s∈{0,1}|O|c
pν,j(~s) |~s〉 〈~s| ⊗ ρ~sν,j
where ν collectively denotes Alice’s choice of variables t, x, r, θ, d; j ranges over Bob’s choices: B
and U ; ~s ranges over all possible values of the corrected values {si} of the measurement outcomes
{bi} sent by Bob to Alice; and ρ~sν,j is the reduced density operator for the non-measured qubits with
the corresponding correction operators for the measurement outcomes ~s has been applied. We call
the outcome density operator B0(ν), obtained from a run of the protocol where all Ui are set to be
the identity operator, the exact outcome density operator. That is the outcome density operator
obtained from a run where Bob exactly follows the step of the protocol.
Note that if we were dealing only with a deterministic pattern over a connected graph state
then the outcome density operator could have been simplified to a fixed pure state of the output
qubits, independent of the measurement outcomes. Moreover in such a scenario the probability
of each branch of the computation would have been the same. However the above definition aims
to capture any general deviation by Bob, that could affect the determinism and probability of the
branches. Also since we will have dummy and trap qubits then not all the possible branches will be
equally probable. The outcome density operator, depending on all the random choices of Alice and
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Bob, can be classified as follows below. Although not all mentioned categories will be used in the
remainder of the paper, we give them here for completeness and to highlight the subtle differences
between possible outcomes.
Definition 9. We say the outcome density operator Bj(ν) is honest if it is indistinguishable from
the exact outcome density operator:
‖Bj(ν)− B0(ν)‖tr = 0,
where ‖·‖tr denotes the trace norm. It is called correct if the quantum output state and the trap
outcome measurement is indistinguishable from the corresponding value of the exact outcome density
operator:
‖Tri 6∈O,i6=t(Bj(ν))− Tri 6∈O,i6=t(B0(ν))‖tr = 0.
It is called lucky if bt = rt and finally it is called incorrect if it is lucky but the quantum output
state, Tri 6∈{O\{t}}(Bj(ν)), is orthogonal to the corresponding subsystem of the exact outcome density
operator. Note that for the classical output scenario, any bit-flip implies orthogonality.
Alice should not care if Bob’s deviation leads to a correct outcome density operator, as the final
quantum or classical output is in the correct state. Therefore, in the definition of a verifiable blind
quantum computation we aim to bound the probability of Alice being fooled, i.e the probability
of Alice accepting an incorrect outcome density operator. Any outcome density operator either
results in st 6= rt or is contained within the subspace of correct and incorrect outcome states.
Hence intuitively, a protocol is defined to be verifiable if the corresponding outcome state is far
from any incorrect outcome states. Following the approach of [5], we first define the notion of
correctness. Recall that for simplicity we have assumed that the computation is deterministic and
the input is in a pure state, and hence the ideal output will necessarily be a pure state. This
restriction to pure states mirrors the approach of [5].
Definition 10. Let P νincorrect be the projection onto the subspace of all the possible incorrect outcome
density operator for the fixed choice of Alice’s random variables ν. It will be convenient to divide
ν into two subsets depending on whether the secret variables correspond to the trap setting or the
remainder of the computation. Thus we define νT = {t, rt, θt} and νC = ν/νT . When the output
state is a pure state, P νincorrect is given by
(I− |Ψideal〉 〈Ψideal|)⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |
where |Ψideal〉 〈Ψideal| = Tri 6∈{O\{t}}(B0(ν)), and where |ηνTt 〉 = |+θt〉 when t ∈ O and |ηνTt 〉 = |rt〉
otherwise. Let p(ν) be the probability of Alice choosing random variables parameterized by ν, that
is the probability of choosing a particular vertex, among all possible vertices of the graph, to be the
trap position (denoted as a random variable t) and the probability of choosing random variables
r, x, θ and d (as defined in Definition 8). Given 0 ≤  < 1, we define a protocol to be -verifiable, if
for any choice of Bob’s strategy (defined as in Definition 8 and denoted by index j) the probability
of Alice accepting an incorrect outcome density operator is bounded by :
Tr(
∑
ν
p(ν) P νincorrect Bj(ν)) ≤ .
Recall that B0(ν) is the output density operator of an honest run after the corrections have
been performed. Hence, in the above definition |Ψideal〉 is independent of ν, since for an honest run
of the protocol, the output state is independent of Alice’s secret parameters, via the correctness
theorem.
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Theorem 8. Protocol 5 is (1− 12m)-verifiable in general, and in the special case of purely classical
output the protocol is also (1− 1m)-verifiable, where m is the total number of qubits in the protocol.
Proof. At the beginning of the protocol, Alice chooses the independent and uniform random vari-
ables for ν. Next Alice prepares the input qubits in the following form:
|eν〉 = Xx11 Z1(θ1)⊗ . . .⊗Xxln Zn(θl) |I〉
and positions them among the first n qubits. Recall that n > |I| and hence the trap qubit might
be among this set of qubits. She then prepares the remaining qubits in the following form (where
D is the index of the dummy qubits)
∀i ∈ D |di〉
∀i 6∈ D ∏j∈NG(i)∩D Zdj |+θi〉 = ∣∣∣+θi+∑j∈NG(i)∩D djpi〉
and sends all m qubits in the order of the labeling of the vertices of the graph, we represent the
whole m qubit state as |Mν〉. We can treat all the measurement angles δi as orthogonal quantum
states |δi〉. For a fixed choice of Alice’s random variables (ν) and Bob’s strategy (j), Bob’s output
from the computation can be written in the form of the output of a circuit computation as depicted
in Figure 6. Note this is the state of the system before the relevant corrections for Alice’s secret
key have been applied to yield the outcome density operator Bj(ν).
While in the actual protocol, at step i, Alice computes δi as a function of s<i which in turn is
calculated from b<i and r<i, we can rewrite the circuit from Figure 6 in such a way that the values
δi are part of the initial state, without affecting causality as they do not interact with anything
until after the corresponding bi has been generated. This intuition is made rigorous in Equation 1
via the inclusion of projections to ensure consistency. This will allow us to reorder all the operators
Ui to the end to obtain the new circuit shown in Figure 7. Note that Figure 7 is not an actual
run of the protocol, it is a mathematical equivalent of Figure 6 where the values of bi have been
fixed to permit us to commute the operators as depicted. However in the following proof we have
considered any general deviation performed by Bob, that is to say we consider any arbitrary Ui
operators.
In the rest of this proof we will use t to represent both the random variable and also the position
of the trap qubit. We denote by Ω = U ′m−nU ′m−n−1...U ′1 the overall action of Bob’s deviation and
by P = (⊗1≤i≤m−nHiZi(δi))EG the action of the exact protocol prior to measurement. Here, and
in Figure 7, we have taken U ′i = PiUiP†i , where Pi =
⊗
i+1≤j≤m−nHjZj(δj). Further we denote by∣∣Ψν,b〉 = ⊗1≤i≤m |Mν〉⊗1≤j≤m−n |δbj〉
the joint state of the initial (input, dummy and prepared) qubits sent by Alice to Bob and the
classical angles δbi , where b represents a possible branch of the computation as parameterized by
the measurement results {bi} sent by Bob to Alice. Finally, in line with Definition 10, we define
CνC ,b to be the Pauli operator which maps the final quantum output state to the correct one
depending on the random variable νC and computation branch b. Hence we have
Bj(ν) = TrB
(∑
b
|b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bΩP((⊗B |0〉 〈0|)⊗ |Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|)P†Ω†C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
. (1)
where (cr)i = ri for all i 6= t and (cr)t = 0, and the subscript B denotes that the partial trace
is taken over Bob’s private register. Here cr is used to compactly deal with the fact that in the
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|0〉⊗B
EG
U1
Uk
Um-n
Z(δk) H bm-n
}QuantumOutput
| 〉
|δ1〉
|δk〉
|δm−n〉
b1Z(δ1) H
Z(δk) H bk
Mν {
Figure 6: A run of protocol together with Bob’s deviation represented as Ui operators. The
entangling operator, EG, is the collection of all the required ctrl-Z operators corresponding to
the graph edges. Note that in Definition 8 we also considered an operator U0 representing Bob’s
initial deviation. In the figure, for simplicity, we have commuted U0 and combined it with U1.
Trivially, if all the Ui operators are set to be identity the above circuit converges to the exact run of
the protocol, where a measurement in the basis |±δi〉 is implemented using the controlled Z-rotation
followed by a Hadamard gate and finally a Pauli Z basis (computation basis) measurement on the
corresponding qubits.
protocol all measured qubits are decrypted by XORing them with r, except for the trap qubit
which remains uncorrected. Note that in the above the operator 〈b| · · · |b〉 acts upon the subspace
of all measured qubits and |b+ cr〉 · · · 〈b+ cr| store the corrected outcome of the measurement. The
above equation includes the dependence of δi on previous measurement results via the inclusion of
the parameter b in the initial state |Ψν,b〉. The projectors |b+ cr〉 〈b| and |b〉 〈b+ cr| then enforce
consistency, by ensuring that measurement results match the values used in the computation of
subsequent δi.
We take P⊥ to be the projection onto the subspace of incorrect states for the non-trap qubits,
after Alice’s final corrections have been applied to any quantum output. Hence
P νincorrect = P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |
where |ηνTt 〉 = |rt〉t for 1 ≤ t ≤ m− n and |ηνTt 〉 = |+θt〉t for m− n+ 1 ≤ t ≤ m. Here we use the
subscript on the ket to identify the relevant qubit. Thus we have
Tr(P νincorrect Bj(ν)) =Tr
(
P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |
(∑
b
|b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bΩP
((⊗B |0〉 〈0|)⊗ |Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|)P†Ω†C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
))
.
24
|0〉⊗B
EG
U’1
U’k
U’m-n
Z(δm-n) H bm-n
}QuantumOutput
|δ1〉
|δk〉
|δm−n〉
b1Z(δ1) H
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Figure 7: The fact that any Uj in Figure 6 is independent of all δi>j , allows us to reposition
the deviation to the end of the circuit as shown above. Hence we can rewrite Bob’s deviation as
U ′i = PiUiP†i , where Pi =
⊗
i+1≤j≤m−nHjZj(δj).
As Bob’s private register is traced out, the net result of Ω is to apply a completely positive trace
preserving map of the other qubits. Taking the Kraus operators associated with this operator to
be {χk}, with
∑
k χkχ
†
k = I, we have
Tr(P νincorrect Bj(ν)) =
∑
k
∑
b
Tr
(
(P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |) |b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bχkP
|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†χk†C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
.
Since any Kraus operator can be written as a linear combination of Pauli operators with complex
coefficients, we have χk =
∑
i αkiσi, where
∑
k
∑
i αkiα
∗
ki = 1 and σi is a Pauli operator acting on
the joint quantum state of the system. Therefore the above equation can be written as
Tr(P νincorrectBj(ν)) =
∑
k
∑
b
Tr
(
(P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |) |b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,b∑
i,j
αkiα
∗
kjσiP |Ψν〉 〈Ψν | P†σj
C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
=
∑
k
∑
b
Tr
(∑
i,j
αkiα
∗
kj (P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |) |b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,b
σiP|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†σjC†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
.
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In order to determine which σi terms have a non-zero contribution in the above sum after the
projection operator is taken into account, it will be necessary to look at the structure of each
such Pauli operator. To this end, we will denote by σi|γ the action of σi on qubit γ, and hence
σi|γ ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}. For simplicity we assume each δi is encoded across 3 qubits (since there are
only 8 possible angles). Thus, we have 1 ≤ γ ≤ (m+ 3(m− n)), where 1 ≤ γ ≤ m identifies qubits
received from Alice and the remaining γ values identify the qubits containing δi. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the qubits representing the values of δ remain unchanged by Bob’s
deviation, and hence we can take σi|γ ∈ {I, Z} for all m < γ.
The probability of Alice accepting an incorrect outcome density operator is given by
pincorrect = Tr(
∑
ν p(ν) P
ν
incorrect Bj(ν)) .
This can be calculated via the expression for Tr(P νincorrect Bj(ν)) obtained earlier
pincorrect =
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr(P νincorrect Bj(ν))
=
∑
k,b
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)
∑
i,j
αkiα
∗
kj (P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |) |b+ cr〉 〈b|
CνC ,bσiP|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†σjC†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
=
∑
b,i,j,k
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα
∗
kj (P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |) |b+ cr〉 〈b|
CνC ,bσiP|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†σjC†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
By noting that |bj + crj 〉 commutes with |Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b| for all j 6= t, the above expression can be
rewritten as
pincorrect =
∑
b,i,j,k
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα
∗
kj (P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |)
|bt〉 〈b|CνC ,bσiP|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†σjC†νC ,b |b〉 〈bt|
)
.
In order to obtain an upper bound for the above expression we make use of sets of indices γ
of qubits such that the action of σi at that position, σi|γ , is a particular Pauli operator, which we
denote as follows:
Ai = {γ s.t. σi|γ = I and 1 ≤ γ ≤ m}
Bi = {γ s.t. σi|γ = X and 1 ≤ γ ≤ m}
Ci = {γ s.t. σi|γ = Y and 1 ≤ γ ≤ m}
Di = {γ s.t. σi|γ = Z and 1 ≤ γ ≤ m}.
Note that in the above we restrict attention to the set of qubits originally sent from Alice to Bob
(which is why 1 ≤ γ ≤ m), and disregard the action on Bob’s private qubits. Additionally, we will
make use of a superscript O to denote subsets of the above sets subject to the constraint that γ is an
output qubit (m− n < γ). Thus, for example, DOi = {γ s.t. σi|γ = Z and m− n+ 1 ≤ γ ≤ m}.
We note that only σi and σj operators for which Tr(P⊥σiP|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†σj) 6= 0 contribute to
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pincorrect. With the above definitions in place, we can express succinctly a necessary condition for
this to hold as |Bi| + |Ci| + |DOi | ≥ 1 (denoted as i ∈ Ei) and |Bj | + |Cj | + |DOj | ≥ 1 (denoted
as j ∈ Ej). That is to say, one or both of the following has happened: σi (σj) has produced an
incorrect outcome for one or more of the measurement results and hence |Bi \ BOi | + |Ci \ COi | ≥
1 (|Bj \ BOj | + |Cj \ COj | ≥ 1) or σi (σj) acts non-trivially on the quantum output and hence
|BOi | + |COi | + |DOi | ≥ 1 (|BOi | + |COj | + |DOj | ≥ 1). Using this set notion and by taking the trace
over the subspace of the measurement results except for the trap qubit we obtain
pincorrect =
∑
k,b
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα
∗
kj (P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |)
|bt〉 〈b|CνC ,bσiP|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†σjC†νC ,b |b〉 〈bt|
)
,
where we take |bt〉 to have have unit dimension if t ∈ O. The reason for doing this is to allow a
uniform treatment of trap qubits independent of whether or not the trap occurs on a measured
qubit. Taking b′ = {bi}i 6=t, a substring of b which excludes the value for the trap measurement, the
above equation can be written as
pincorrect =
∑
k,b
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα
∗
kj (P⊥ ⊗ (|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | bt〉 〈bt|))
〈
b′
∣∣CνC ,bσiP|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†σjC†νC ,b ∣∣b′〉
)
Note in the above that if the trap is measured we have 〈ηνTt | bt〉 = δηνTt ,bt , otherwise |bt〉 〈bt| = 1.
Hence we have
pincorrect =
∑
k,b′
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα
∗
kj (P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |)
∣∣b′〉 〈b′∣∣
CνC ,b′σiP|Ψν,b
′〉〈Ψν,b′ |P†σjC†νC ,b′
)
=
∑
k,b′
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
(
(P⊥ ⊗ |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |)
∣∣b′〉 〈b′∣∣
CνC ,b′
∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
P|Ψν,b′〉〈Ψν,b′ |P†
∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
†C†νC ,b′
)
≤
∑
k,b′
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
((|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗ ∣∣b′〉 〈b′∣∣)
CνC ,b′
∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
P|Ψν,b′〉〈Ψν,b′ |P†
∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
†C†νC ,b′
)
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=
∑
k,b′
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
((|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗ ∣∣b′〉 〈b′∣∣)
∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
P|Ψν,b′〉〈Ψν,b′ |P†
∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
†),
where the inequality follows from the fact that the projector, P⊥, acts on a positive semi-definite
matrix, and the last equality follows from the fact that both remaining projectors act as the identity
on qubits in O.
Next, we attempt to show that a necessary requirement for a term in the above summation over
i and j to be non-zero is that i = j. As per the proof of blindness, summing over νC yields the
maximally mixed state of the system received from Alice. Hence we have
pincorrect ≤
∑
k,b′,νT
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
αikα
∗
jkp(νT )Tr
((|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗ ∣∣b′〉 〈b′∣∣)
σi
(
|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗ |δt〉 〈δt| ⊗
I
Tr(I)
)
σj
)
=
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
αikα
∗
jkp(νT )Tr
(
|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |σi
(
|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗ |δt〉 〈δt| ⊗
I
Tr(I)
)
σj
)
=
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
αikα
∗
jkp(νT )Tr
(
〈ηνTt |σi
(
|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗ |δt〉 〈δt| ⊗
I
Tr(I)
)
σj |ηνTt 〉
)
.
As all Pauli matrices other than the identity are traceless, any terms in the sum which are non-
zero necessarily have σi|γ = σj|γ everywhere except for γ = t and the corresponding delta register.
We then consider the two cases corresponding to whether the trap is located in the quantum
output or not separately. If t ∈ O then the delta register does not exist, and using the fact that∑
θt,rt
Tr
( 〈ηνTt |σi |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |σj |ηνTt 〉 ) = 0, unless σi|t = σj|t, we arrive at the conclusion that the
only terms which contribute to pincorrect are those where σi = σj . If, on the other hand, t /∈ O,
then averaging over rt alone is sufficient to give Tr
( 〈ηνTt |σi |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |σj |ηνTt 〉 ) = 0, and hence
σi|t = σj|t. In this case, averaging over θ yields the δt register in the maximally mixed state, and
hence as before σi and σj must act identically on these qubits too, in order to avoid contributing
zero to the value of pincorrect. Consequently the only terms which contribute are those for which
σi = σj . Using this identity with our previous expression for pincorrect, we obtain
pincorrect ≤
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
αikα
∗
ikp(νT )Tr
(
〈ηνTt |σi
(
|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗ |δt〉 〈δt| ⊗
I
Tr(I)
)
σi |ηνTt 〉
)
=
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
|αik|2p(νT )Tr
(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)
=
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
|αik|2p(νT )
(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
=
1
16m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
∑
t,rt,θt
(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
=
1
16m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
( ∑
t≤m−n,θt,rt
( 〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉 )2 + ∑
m−n<t,θt,rt
( 〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉 )2
)
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=
1
16m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
 ∑
t≤m−n,θt,rt
( 〈rt|σi|t |rt〉 )2 + ∑
m−n<t,θt,rt
( 〈+θt |σi|t |+θt〉 )2

=
1
16m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
((
16|Ai \AOi |+ 16|Di \DOi |
)
+
(
8|BOi |+ 8|COi |+ 16|AOi |
))
=
1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
(
2|Ai|+ 2|Di \DOi |+ |BOi |+ |COi |
)
.
This can be further simplified, since |Ai|+ |Bi|+ |Ci|+ |Di| = m, giving
pincorrect ≤ 1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
(
2m− 2(|Bi|+ |Ci|+ |DOi |) + |BOi |+ |COi |
)
≤ 1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
(
2m− |Bi| − |Ci| − 2|DOi |
)
≤ 1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2 (2m− 1)
≤ 1− 1
2m
for the general case. However, for the specific case of only classical output, this bound can be made
tighter by performing the simplification in a different way, since |BOi | = |COi | = |DOi | = 0, and
hence
pincorrect ≤ 1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
(
2|Ai|+ 2|Di \DOi |+ |BOi | − |COi |
)
=
1
m
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi|+|Ci|≥1
|αki|2 (|Ai|+ |Di|)
=
1
m
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi|+|Ci|≥1
|αki|2 (m− |Bi| − |Ci|)
≤ 1
m
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi|+|Ci|≥1
|αki|2 (m− 1)
≤ 1− 1
m
.
This single trap construction will be generalised in the next section to allow for exponential
supression of the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome even in the case of quantum output.
We finish this section by showing that even this simple construction can be used to verify universal
quantum computation, using the cylinder brickwork state presented in Section 5.
It is easy to verify that if Alice chooses a random row of a cylinder graph GCn×m (Figure 4) and
prepares all the qubits of that row in the states |zi〉 where zi ∈R {0, 1} and the rest of nodes in
the state |+〉 then after entangling according to the cylinder brickwork graph the obtained state
is a G(n−1)×m
⊗m
i=1 |zi〉. By choosing a random trap location and a dummy tape which contains
its neighbourhood we can construct a single-trap verifiable universal blind quantum computing
protocol, given by Protocol 6 and illustrated in Figure 8.
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1.           3.
2.           4.
Tape
Tape
Figure 8: Single-trap verifiable universal blind quantum computation using the cylinder brickwork
state: 1. A random qubit is chosen to be the trap qubit, the (red) filled node. 2. All other vertices
in the tape containing the trap qubit the solid (black) nodes, are set to be dummy qubits. 3.
This results in an isolated trap qubit in the state |+θ〉 together with many dummy qubtis after
entaglement operations are applied by the server. 4. The net result, after discarding the dummy
qubits, is a disentangled trap qubit in a product state with a brickwork state.
Corollary 1. Protocol 6 is universal, blind while leaking at most m and n as well as being is
(1− 12m)-verifiable in general and (1− 1m)-verifiable in the case of classical output.
Proof. Since the dummy qubits are prepared in eigenstates of Pauli Z operator, they remain in
a product state with the rest of the system after the entangling operations are applied by Bob.
The result, as depicted in Figure 8, is that the trap qubit also remains in a product state, and a
brickwork state is prepared in the subsystem excluding T . The universality property then follows
directly from the universality of the brickwork state from Theorem 5. As Protocol 6 is a special
case of Protocol 3, the blindness property follows directly from Theorem 4 and therefore the angles
of measurement φi remain secret from Bob. Moreover, the universality of the cylinder brickwork
state guarantees that Bob’s knowledge of GCn×m does not reveal anything about the underlying
computation except n and m. As Protocol 6 is also a special case of Protocol 5, the verifiability
property follows directly from Theorem 8.
7 Probability Amplification for Universal Verifiable Blind QC
In the previous section we presented a very simple verifiable protocol where the probability of Bob
succeeding in making Alice accept an incorrect outcome density operator was strictly less than 1.
Building upon that simple construction, by adding more traps and making the computation fault
tolerant, we can make the probability of Alice accepting an incorrect outcome density operator as
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Protocol 6 Single-Trap Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computation
• Alice’s resources
– A graph G = GCn×m and a randomly chosen vertex t of G.
– The rest of the resources are the same as Protocol 3 where φi = 0 for i = t and i ∈ D where
D contains the set of all vertices in a tape T that contains position t and all of its neighbours.
• Follow the steps of Protocol 3.
• Accept/Reject
– After obtaining all the output qubits from Bob, if the trap qubit, t, is an output qubit,
Alice measures it with angle δt = θt + rtpi to obtain bt.
– Alice accepts if bt = rt.
small as required. The central idea is to design a protocol with O(N) many traps in essentially
random locations, where N is the number of qubits in the protocol, to increase the probability of
any local error being detected. The fault-tolerance is added to increase the minimum weight of
any operator which leads to an incorrect outcome, and hence further increase the probability of
detection. Here, and in what follows, the weight of a Pauli operator is defined to be the number
of qubits upon which it acts non-trivially. First, given such a protocol we show how it amplifies
the verification parameter. We then present the central contribution of this paper, a new universal
verifiable blind quantum computing protocol that achieves the probability amplification without
any such assumptions.
Theorem 9. Let P be a blind quantum computing protocol on N qubits with NT isolated traps in
the states |+θt〉 at a set of positions T chosen uniformly at random. Let NT /N be a constant c and
assume that the computation is encoded in such a way that any Pauli error with weight less than
d will be corrected or an error will be detected. Then the protocol is (1 − c2)d-verifiable in general,
and (1− c)d-verifiable in the case of purely classical output.
Proof. In order to exploit Theorem 8, we notionally partition the qubits into independent sets
with one single trap qubit in each set. These partitions amount to extra information about the
location of the trap qubits, and hence their inclusion can only serve to increase the probability of
Bob convincing Alice to accept an incorrect state. Thus the bound we obtain with this additional
information is still an upper bound on the probability of Alice accepting an incorrect output when
these partitions are unknown. There are NT many such sets Sγ with 1/c many qubits in each set.
We adopt a similar proof strategy to that used to prove Theorem 8, taking
P νincorrect = P⊥
⊗
t∈T
|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |
as the projection onto the subspace of incorrect outcomes. As in the proof of Theorem 8, only
those Pauli operators contribute to pincorrect where one or both of the following has happened: σi
has produced an incorrect outcome for some of the measurement results bi or σi acts non-trivially
on the quantum output. Now due to the error-detection property of the encoding assumed in the
statement of the theorem we need to consider only those σi where |Bi|+ |Ci|+ |DOi | ≥ d. Following
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the steps of the proof of Theorem 8 we obtain
pincorrect =
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr(P νincorrectBj(ν))
≤
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi|+|Ci|+|DOi |≥d
|αki|2
∑
T
p(T )
∏
t∈T
∑
θt,rt
p(θt)p(rt)
(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
 .
Here we can exploit the structure we have introduced through the sets Sγ
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi|+|Ci|+|DOi |≥d
|αki|2
NT∏
γ=1
∑
tγ ,θtγ ,rtγ
p(tγ)p(θtγ )p(rtγ )〈ηνtγ |σi|tγ |ηνtγ 〉2.
where tγ is taken to be the location of the trap qubit in set Sγ . Rearranging the above and
substituting in the values of p(tγ), p(θtγ ), and p(rtγ ) we obtain
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi|+|Ci|+|DOi |≥d
|αki|2
NT∏
γ=1
∑
tγ ,θtγ ,rtγ
c
16
〈ηνtγ |σi|tγ |ηνtγ 〉2.
Note that within each set the position of the trap is chosen uniformly at random and so the
probability of detection by that trap corresponds to the bound obtained for Theorem 8. Going
through the steps of the proof of Theorem 8 we obtain
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi|+|Ci|+|DOi |≥d
|αki|2
NT∏
γ=1
c
2
(
2|Aiγ |+ 2|Diγ \DOiγ |+ |BOiγ |+ |COiγ |
)
=
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi|+|Ci|+|DOi |≥d
|αki|2
NT∏
γ=1
c
2
(
2
c
− 2|DOiγ | − |Biγ | − |Ciγ | − |Biγ \BOiγ | − |Ciγ \ COiγ |
)
,
where we use the additional γ subscript on sets |Aiγ |, ..., |Diγ | to indicate subsets of the respective
sets, subject to the restriction that the elements are also in Sγ . For convenience we define wiγ =
|Biγ |+ |Ciγ |+ |DOiγ | and wi = |Bi|+ |Ci|+ |DOi |. Thus we obtain
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i:wi≥d
|αki|2
NT∏
γ=1
c
2
(
2
c
− wiγ − |Biγ \BOiγ | − |Ciγ \ COiγ | − |DOiγ |
)
≤
∑
k
∑
i:wi≥d
|αki|2
NT∏
γ=1
(
1− cwiγ
2
)
.
We now make use of the fact that, for any positive a, 1− ac2 ≤ (1− (a− 1) c2)(1− c2). As wiγ is a
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non-negative integer, we can recursively apply this identity to obtain
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i:wi≥d
|αki|2
NT∏
γ=1
(
1− c
2
)wiγ
=
∑
k
∑
i:wi≥d
|αki|2(1− c
2
)
∑NT
γ=1 wiγ
=
∑
k
∑
i:wi≥d
|αki|2(1− c
2
)wi
≤
∑
k
∑
i:wi≥d
|αki|2(1− c
2
)d
≤ (1− c
2
)d.
In the case of purely classical output this bound can be improved, since |BOi | = |COi | = |DOi | = 0.
Going through the same steps with this additional constraint gives
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i:wi≥d
|αki|2
NT∏
γ=1
(1− cwiγ)
≤ (1− c)d.
We can now present the final contribution of this paper, a new scheme for blind quantum
computing which has all the previously described properties: correctness, universality, blindness of
angles, input, output and computation and more importantly verifiability with exponentially small
probability of error. Roughly speaking, universality and correctness will be obtained by using
dotted-complete graph states (similar to Protocol 4). In order to achieve verification we exploit the
idea of dummy qubits (similar to Protocol 3) to create, blindly, out of a dotted-complete graph state
K˜3N three disconnected smaller dotted-complete graph states K˜N . Then we use two of these graph
states to create O(N) isolated trap qubits at random positions (similar to Protocol 5). The final
step is to perform the actual computation over the remaining dotted-complete graph state in such
a way that the stated property in Theorem 9 is also satisfied. That is, to have the measurement
pattern encoded in such a way that any Pauli error with weight less than d, will be either corrected
or detected. Such an encoding exists through the fault tolerant one-way quantum computing scheme
of [44]. All that is needed is to create a three dimensional cluster state from the dotted-complete
graph state and proceed with the fault tolerant computation scheme of Raussendorf, Harrington
and Goyal [43, 44]6.
We first give a concrete protocol for choosing the required parameters for the Raussendorf,
Harrington and Goyal scheme, given the desired security threshold for the verification, see Protocol
7. This will fix the size of the dotted-graph state, N , required for the actual computation. However
as stated above, we will start with a dotted-complete graph state of size 3N and will break it into
6In its original form, this scheme requires Z-basis measurements to be made adaptively, which is not easily
implementable using dummy qubits. However, the location of the dummy qubits can be fixed by always including a
correction step for each gate teleportation in the logical circuit, where the angle of the correction is adapted based
on the outcome of the teleportation. An alternative option is to use a slightly modified version of the scheme due to
Morimae and Fujii [37], which requires only measurements in the X-Y plane. Although we assume the first scenario
here, an almost identical proof applies to the second scenario.
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three smaller dotted-complete graph states of size N each, see Figure 9. We will refer to these
graphs as the white trap graph, the black trap graph and the computation graph. In the white trap
graph all the vertices in P (K˜N ) will become isolated traps (called white traps) by choosing all
the vertices in A(K˜N ) to be dummy qubits. Similarly in the black trap graph all the vertices in
A(K˜N ) will become isolated traps (called black traps) by choosing all the vertices in P (K˜N ) to be
dummy qubits. We have to choose both type of vertices (A(K˜3N ) and P (K˜3N )) to be potentially
isolated traps otherwise Bob could choose to cheat on one type rather than the other one. In order
to make the position of traps random, Alice will choose a random partition of P (K˜3N ) into three
equal size sets, and will choose appropriate dummy qubits (similar to Lemma 2) to obtain the three
disconnected graphs. Note that this will lead to random positions for trap qubits, however the
positions of trap qubits will be also correlated with each other and we will take care of this issue
when we present the proof of the verification. The above procedure is formalized in Protocol 7 and
finally Protocol 8 presents a hiding protocol that is universal, verifiable and blind.
As a high level overview of the fault-tolerance scheme, qubits are encoded topologically as
chains of defects (qubits to be measured in the Z basis) of finite thickness and separation (referred
to as the scale parameter) which trace out a path through the three dimensional structure of the
resource state. The encoding forces non-detectable errors to be topologically non-trivial chains,
either connecting or encircling defect chains. Certain Clifford group operations are implemented
directly by braiding these defect chains. For the remaining operations required for universality it
is necessary to implement the gate by first distilling a suitable resource state which is then used
to implement the gate via teleportation (all within the topologically encoded computation). While
the teleportation can be done with Clifford group operations, the distillation is implemented on
a concatenated encoding where at each level of concatenation the corresponding distillation step
is topologically encoded with progressively higher defect thicknesses and scale parameters. At the
lowest level, however, the operations are performed directly on physical qubits, and so the defect
chains are only a single qubit in diameter.
Theorem 10. Assume Alice and Bob follow the steps of Protocol 8, then Alice always accepts the
output and the outcome density operator is correct.
Proof. First we note that it is always possible to choose measurement patterns MP by Lemma 2 and
MReduce by Lemma 1. Further, by the universality of the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal encoding,
it is always possible to choose MComp. As the measurements composing MP , MReduce, MP and
MA are composed entirely of Pauli basis measurements, there is no partial time ordering imposed
on the sequence of measurements, and so the times at which these measurements are made have
no effect on the outcome of the protocol. Thus for any honest run of the protocol, the result will
be the same as if the measurements from MP were made first. By construction this measurement
pattern splits the graph state into three separate graph states K˜N .
The dummy qubits in MP and MA correspond to break operations in their respective graphs
by Lemma 4 and hence after the initial step all the trap qubits remain unentangled from the rest.
Recall that for these trap qubits φi = 0, and since the qubit is prepared in the state |+θi〉 and
measured in basis {|+θi〉 , |−θi〉}, the measurement result communicated to Alice is si = ri for all
such qubits. Thus, Alice always accepts, satisfying the first criterion.
By definition MReduce transforms the graph state corresponding to K˜N to the resource state
necessary to implement MComp. Lastly, measuring according to MComp yields the correct output
of C by the correctness of the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal protocol.
Theorem 11. Protocol 8 is blind while leaking at most N .
Proof. The proof is directly obtained from Theorem 4.
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Protocol 7 Measurement Pattern Choice
In what follows choosing a measurement pattern means fixing the underlying graph state together
with the appropriate angles of computation such that the resulting pattern implements the desired
computation due to universality. Similarly choosing a partial measurement pattern means fixing
the underlying graph state together with a partial set of angles of computation corresponding to a
partial computation, where the rest of angles will be fixed in Protocol 8 where this protocol is called
as a subroutine. Here, we assume that a standard labeling of the vertices of each dotted-complete
graph state is known to both Alice and Bob.
1. Alice chooses security parameter d, then transforms the quantum circuit C corresponding to
her desired computation into (or directly designs) a measurement pattern MComp on a graph
state GL which implements her computation using the encoding for topological fault-tolerant
measurement-based quantum computation due to Raussendorf, Harrington and Goyal [44],
where GL is taken to correspond to the graph state of the 3D lattice L introduced in [44] with
sufficient dimensions Dx, Dy and Dz to implement her computation using an encoding with
parameters as follows:
• Defect thickness d
• Lattice scale parameter λ = 5d
• Distillation of resource states |A〉 and |Y 〉 using L = dlog3(d)e levels
• For each concatenation level 1 < ` < L the thickness parameter and scale parameter for
that level are chosen as d` = 3d`−1 and λ` = λ`−1, with d1 = 1, λ1 = 5, dL = d and
λL = λ.
2. Alice chooses a partial measurement pattern MReduce which reduces the graph state K˜N to
the graph state GL through Pauli measurements (Theorem 6), where N is the total number
of qubits in L.
3. Alice chooses a partial measurement pattern MP on the graph state K˜N such that every qubit
corresponding to a vertex in A(K˜N ) are set to be dummy qubits. Hence all vertices in P (K˜N )
are isolated traps.
4. Alice chooses a partial measurement pattern MA on the graph state K˜N such that every qubit
corresponding to a vertex in P (K˜N ) is set to be dummy qubits. Hence all vertices in A(K˜N )
are isolated traps.
5. For the graph K˜3N , Alice chooses uniformly at random a partitioning P of the vertices into
three equal sized sets of vertices P1, P2 and P3.
6. Alice takes MP to be the partial measurement pattern where the required vertices in A(K˜3N )
are set to be dummy qubits such that the resulting state is the tensor product of three
graph states of the three disconnected graphs k˜1 = K˜N , k˜2 = K˜N and k˜3 = K˜N , such that
P (k˜i) = Pi.
7. Alice calculates M, her overall measurement pattern on a graph state corresponding to K˜3N
by combining the partial pattern MP with MComp and MReduce applied to subgraph k˜1 and MP
and MA applied to subgraphs k˜2 and k˜3 respectively, to obtain a full measurement pattern.
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Protocol 8 Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computation
• Alice’s resources
– Alice chooses the pattern M and random partitioning P according to Protocol 7.
– The dummy qubits position, set D chosen according to Protocol 7.
– A sequence of measurement angles, φ = (φi)1≤i≤3N(3N+1)/2 with φi ∈ A, according to the
description of Protocol 7, where φi = 0 for all the trap and dummy qubits. The ordering of
the measurements on P (K˜3N ) is chosen uniformly at random subject to the constraint that
the partial ordering of measurements from MComp determined by flow is preserved. Such a
random ordering is required to hide the position of the trap qubits. The qubits in A(K˜3N )
are measured first in the order that the relevant edge entry appears in the adjacency matrix
of K3N once this random ordering has been taken into account. That is, the site in A(K˜3N )
which is joined by edges to i and j in P (K˜3N ), with i < j in the random ordering imposed
on P (K˜3N ), is measured in position 3N(i− 1) + j − i(i+1)2 . Note that the measurement order
of the vertices in A should be independent of the computation (and traps), so in the above
we prescribe one such suitable sequence. This is followed by the measurements of P (K˜3N ) in
the randomly chosen order.
– 3N(3N + 1)/2 random variables θi with value taken uniformly at random from A.
– 3N(3N + 1)/2 random variables ri and |D| random variable di with values taken uniformly
at random from {0, 1}.
– A fixed function C(i, φi, θi, ri, s) that for each non output qubit i computes the angle of the
measurement of qubit i to be sent to Bob.
• Initial Step
– Alice’s move: Alice sets all the value in s to be 0 and prepares the qubits in the following
form
∀i ∈ D |di〉
∀i 6∈ D ∏j∈NG(i)∩D Zdj |+θi〉
and sends Bob all the 3N(3N + 1)/2 qubits in the order of the labeling of the vertices of the
graph.
– Bob’s move: Bob receives 3N(3N + 1)/2 single qubits and entangles them according to
K˜3N .
• Step i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3N(3N + 1)/2
– Alice’s move: Alice computes the angle δi = C(i, φi, θi, ri, s) and sends it to Bob.
– Bob’s move: Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the result bi.
– Alice’s move: Alice sets the value of si in s to be si + ri.
• Verification
Alice accepts if si = ri for all the white and black trap qubits i.
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Figure 9: A graphical depiction of Protocol 8. In this figure we replace the Raussendorf-Harrington-
Goyal encoding in the first step with a simpler computation, as to include a full encoding yields
graphs too large to reasonably draw.
In order to prove the verification property, as stated in Theorem 9, we require that the mea-
surement pattern is encoded in such a way that any Pauli error of weight less than d will be either
corrected or detected. We now show that this is true for the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal scheme
although this is already implicit in their paper [44], we make it explicit here for completeness. In
what follows, we take L to be the 3D lattice corresponding to the resource state used in [44].
Lemma 5. Let MC be a measurement pattern which implements a computation C on GL, the graph
state corresponding to the lattice L, using the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal fault tolerance scheme
with the following parameters
• Defect thickness d
• Lattice scale parameter λ = 5d
• Distillation of resource states |A〉 and |Y 〉 using L = dlog3(d)e levels
• For each concatenation level 1 < ` < L the thickness parameter and scale parameter for that
level are chosen as d` = 3d`−1 and λ` = 3λ`−1, with d1 = 1, λ1 = 5, dL = d and λL = λ.
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Take σ = {σi} to be a set of Pauli operators, such that each σi ∈ {I,X, Y, Z} and acts on qubit
i. Then for any σ, if MC is implemented on state |GL〉, but the output of each measurement
result or unmeasured qubit i is modified by applying σi, then either the computation is correct
(corresponding to a run where all σi = I) or an error is detected when the output is decoded, unless
|BL| + |CL| + |DOL | ≥ 2d, where BL = {γ : σγ = X}, CL = {γ : σγ = Y } and DOL = {γ : σγ =
Z and γ ∈ O}, and where O is the set of output (unmeasured) qubits.
Proof. In the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal scheme, logical qubits are topologically protected
against errors. The two lowest weight topological errors are error cycles around defects and error
chains running between defects. As defects have thickness d, any cross-section forms a rectangle of
dimension at least d× d and thus perimeter at least 4(d+ 1). As an error cycle must fit around the
remaining defect, the minimum error cycle is at least 4d. As the centers of defects are separated by
distance λ, the minimum distance between defects is λ− d and hence for our parameters we have
λ− d = 4d.
The only region where this topological protection breaks down is within the regions used to
distill the resource states |A〉 and |Y 〉. This distillation is performed using a concatenation of L
levels of the Reed-Muller (|A〉) or Steane (|Y 〉) codes. Each level ` of distillation is topologically
protected with parameters d` and λ`. As the Reed-Muller and Steane codes are both distance 3,
an error at level ` can be caused either by a topological error at that level or not less than 3 errors
at the previous level. However, since at each level ` < L we have λ`− d` = 4d` and d` = 3d`−1, the
minimum weight w` to create an error at level ` is min(4d`, 8d`−1, 4d`−1 + w`−1, 3w`−1). The four
terms in this last expression account, respectively, for the minimum weight errors in each of the
four possible cases: 1) The error is entirely topological at level `, 2) The error is entirely topological
at level ` − 1, 3) the error includes both topological errors at level ` − 1 (which in the worst case
affects two qubits with a single weight 4d` error chain) and inherited errors from level ` − 2, and
4) the case where all errors are inherited from level `− 2.
We then prove that w` > 2d` by induction, as follows. Assume that at level i we have wi > 2di.
In that case we have wi+1 = min(4di+1, 6di), since by assumption 4di+wi > 6di and 3wi > 6di, and
clearly 8di > 6di. However, we have di+1 = 3di for all levels except the top level, where dL ≤ 3dL−1.
Thus, in general, 2di+1 ≤ 6di, and hence wi+1 > 2di+1. At the lowest level the error distillation
uses unencoded qubits measured in non-Pauli bases, and so w0 = 1, so w1 = 3 > 2d1 = 2 and thus
by induction on i we obtain the result that wL > 2d as required.
Note, however, that any operation on a measured qubit which is diagonal in the computational
basis (σi ∈ {I, Z}) does not alter the computation. Hence an undetectable logical error is not
created unless the total number of measured sites for which σi ∈ {X,Y } plus the total number of
output qubits for which σi ∈ {X,Y, Z} is equal to or greater than 2d. Thus the outcome is either
correct or when decoded results in a detected error, unless |BL|+ |CL|+ |DOL | ≥ 2d.
Now we link the above general property of the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal scheme to our
specific protocol. To do so, we first introduce the notion of independently detectable errors.
Definition 11. Given a dotted-complete graph state K˜N , a set of output qubits O, a measurement
pattern Mtarget containing only X-Y plane measurements and Z basis measurements, and a set of
single qubit Pauli operators σ = {σi}Ni=1 with σi ∈ {I,X, Y, Z} which represent errors which modify
each measurement result or unmeasured output qubit i by the application of σi, for each location i
we define the set i = {i} for i ∈ P (K˜N ), and i = NK˜N (i) for i ∈ A(K˜N ). We say that σ contains
k independently detectable errors if and only if there exists a set E of k locations such that
• For all i ∈ E, σi ∈ {X,Y } if i /∈ O or else σi ∈ {X,Y, Z} if i ∈ O, and
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• i ∩ j = 0 for all pairs i, j ∈ E.
The intuition behind this definition is that in Protocol 8 the qubits in P (K˜3N ) are independently
randomly distributed between the two trap graphs and the computation graph, and whether or not
a qubit in A(K˜3N ) coincides with a trap or not depends only on the placement of the neighboring
qubits (which are both in P (K˜3N )). The first condition ensures that the error anticommutes with
some possible measurement of the system, and is hence truly an error, while the second condition
ensures that we are considering only qubits associated with disjoint subsets of P (K˜3N ), and hence
whether or not they coincide with a trap is uncorrelated. With this definition in place, we can
proceed with proving a corollary to Lemma 5 which links that result with Protocol 8.
Corollary 2. Let MC be a measurement pattern which implements a computation C on graph state
GL of N vertices using the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal scheme with parameters
• Defect thickness d
• Lattice scale parameter λ = 5d
• Distillation of resource states |A〉 and |Y 〉 using L = dlog3(d)e levels
• For each concatenation level 1 < ` < L the thickness parameter and scale parameter for that
level are chosen as d` = 3d`−1 and λ` = λ`−1, with d1 = 1, λ1 = 5, dL = d and λL = λ.
Further, let MReduce be a partial measurement pattern consisting of Pauli Z and Pauli Y mea-
surements on qubits corresponding to the vertices in A(K˜N ) which reduces K˜N to GL up to local
Z-rotations. Let M be the measurement pattern for graph state K˜N produced by applying the partial
pattern MReduce to the qubits corresponding to vertices in A(K˜N ) and MC (with appropriate local
Z-rotations applied) to the qubits corresponding to vertices in P (K˜N ).
Take σ = {σi} to be a set of single qubit Pauli operators, such that each σi ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}
acts on qubit i. Then for any σ, if MC is implemented on state K˜N , but the output of each
measurement result or unmeasured qubit is modified by applying σi, then either the computation is
correct (corresponding to a run where all σi = I) or an error is detected when the output is decoded,
unless σ contains at least d2d5 e independently detectable errors.
Proof. First we note that only qubits in P (K˜3N ) are contained in O, since all qubits in A(K˜3N )
will be measured to make the required resource states. All measurements on qubits associated with
vertices A(K˜N ) are in either the Y or Z basis, allowing any error in the measurement outcome to
be associated with an X error on the underlying qubit. As the generators for the stabilizer of K˜N
are simply the operators Xi
∏
j∈NK˜N (i)
Zj , and each vertex in A(K˜N ) has only two neighbors, both
of which lie in P (K˜N ), an X error on a qubit associated with a vertex in A(K˜N ) is equivalent to a
local error on each of two qubits in P (K˜N ). Thus any local Pauli operator in σ
i associated with a
vertex in A(K˜N ) can be either replaced by at most two local operators acting on qubits associated
with vertices in P (K˜N ) without altering the outcome of the computation, or has no effect on the
computation. Note that since Pauli Z operators always commute with Z basis measurements, and
anticommute with any measurement in the X − Y plane, these local operators are always Pauli
operators due to the corresponding restriction on Mtarget.
The only Pauli terms which can affect the outcome of the computation are those which either
flip a measurement outcome (X or Y ) or those which act non-trivially upon an unmeasured qubit
(as either X, Y or Z). By Lemma 5, the outcome of the computation is unaltered unless σ
produces such errors on at least 2d sites. To show that this implies the existence of at least d2d5 e
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independently detectable errors we will consider the effects of errors on A(K˜N ) and P (K˜N ) in
relation to the resource state for the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal scheme, GL. Errors on A(K˜N )
only occur when the qubit in question is measured in the Y basis, since for Z basis measurements
dummy qubits are used and the outcome of Bob’s measurement is ignored. Thus, as we have shown
above, such errors correspond to local Pauli errors at either end of an edge in the GL. Errors in
P (K˜N ), however, correspond simply to errors on single vertices in GL. Therefore, we can consider
any error introduced by σ as corresponding to a subgraph gσ of GL, where i ∈ A(K˜N ) introduces
the vertices in NK˜N (i) together with a connecting edge, while i ∈ P (K˜N ) simply introduces the
vertex i. Such a subgraph contains all of the qubits in GL which can possibly be affected by local
errors after the measurement of qubits according to MReduce are taken into account (propagating
errors from A(K˜N ) to P (K˜N )).
Figure 10: The unit cell for the lattice corresponding to the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal scheme,
GL, complete with one choice of 4-edge-colouring.
We note that any connected subgraph gγσ of gσ containing nγ vertices necessarily contains at
least nγ − 1 edges. Note also that GL is 4-edge-colorable (see Figure 10). Thus, by the pigeonhole
principle, there is at least one color for that subgraph which corresponds to at least dnγ−14 e edges.
As the various subgraphs gγσ are disconnected, we are free to choose the colouring independently
for each, and hence can choose a single 4-edge-colouring for gσ such that it includes at least dnγ−14 e
edges from each subgraph. We then take the set E to correspond to qubits in A(K˜N ) corresponding
to edges of this color, as well as to the single vertex in any gγσ for which nγ = 1, hence i∩j = 0. By
Lemma 5, this insures that the outcome of the computation is either correct or an error is detected
upon decoding, or σ contains at least
∑
γ:nγ≥2d
nγ−1
4 e+
∑
γ:nγ=1
1 independently detectable errors,
where
∑
γ nγ ≥ 2d. Note that ∑
γ:nγ≥2
dnγ − 1
4
e+
∑
γ:nγ=1
1 ≥ 2d
5
,
and hence the computation is either correct or an error is detected upon decoding, or σ contains
at least d2d5 e independently detectable errors.
The above corollary guarantees that one of the condition of Theorem 9 for the verification with
the amplified security is satisfied. However we cannot yet directly use that theorem since, as stated
before, the position of the traps are not completely random as the position of the black traps are
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fixed once we choose the random position assignment of qubits in P (K˜3N ) to each of the three
subgraphs. This is why we have introduced the notion of independently detectable errors. Here we
give a direct proof of verification for Protocol 8 following the same steps as the proof of Theorem
9.
Theorem 12. Protocol 8 is in general (5/6)d
2d
5
e-verifiable, and in the case of only classical output
is (2/3)d
2d
5
e-verifiable, where d is the security parameter as described in Protocol 7.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows the same strategy as Theorem 8, first taking the most
general strategy for Bob, expanding this in terms of Pauli operators, and lastly showing that any
Pauli term which leads to an incorrect outcome is detected with high-probability. We note that
any deviation by Bob from Protocol 8 can be rewritten in the form shown in Figure 7. The proof
of this is identical to the corresponding step in the proof of Theorem 8: Without loss of generality
any deviation by Bob from the protocol can be written in the form of Figure 6. We can treat {δi}
as inputs to the circuit without violating causality, as they do not interact with any other part of
the computation until after bj has been measured, for all j < i. Then simply by reordering the
operators via their commutation relations we obtain the form in Figure 7 as required. As a result,
any deviation by Bob can be written as a single deviation operator Ω which acts upon the quantum
states Bob receives from Alice as well as δi and some private register held by Bob. Similar to the
proof of Theorem 8 the probability of Alice accepting an incorrect outcome density operator is then
pincorrect =
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr (P νincorrectBj(ν))
=
∑
b,ν
p(ν)Tr
(
Pincorrect |b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bΩ
(
P|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†
)
C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
=
∑
k,b,i,j,ν
p(ν)αkiα
∗
kjTr
(
P⊥
(⊗
t∈T
|ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |
)
|b+ cr〉 〈b|
CνC ,bσiP|Ψν,b〉〈Ψν,b|P†σjC†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
,
where as in previous proofs, we take the Kraus operators associated with the Ω, once Bob’s private
system has been removed, to be χk =
∑
i αkiσi, with
∑
k
∑
i αkiα
∗
ki = 1.
By Corollary 2, P⊥ projects out the terms in the above sum where σi does not contain at
least d2d5 e independently detectable errors on the computation graph. This is a somewhat stronger
condition than we actually need, and so we will consider terms corresponding to any σi which
produces at least d2d5 e independently detectable errors in total across all three subgraphs (the
computation graph and the two trap graphs). We will denote by I the set of all i for which σi does
not satisfy this condition. Similar to the proof of Theorem 8, all terms for which i 6= j average to
zero. Thus, as in the proof of Theorem 9, we obtain
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
∑
T
p(T )|αki|2
∏
t∈T
∑
θt,rt
p(θt)p(rt)〈ηνTt |σi|ηνTt 〉2
 .
As before, we introduce notional sets Sγ of three qubits each such that exactly one qubit from each
set is on each of the three subgraphs (the two trap graphs and the computation graph), and where
either all of the qubits are in P (K˜3N ) or all of the qubits are in A(K˜3N ) (ensuring exactly one trap
41
and at least one dummy qubit per set). As every σi in the above sum corresponds to at least d2d5 e
independently detectable (and hence uncorrelated) errors across these sets Sγ , we have
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
∏
γ
 ∑
tγ ,rtγ ,θtγ
p(tγ)p(rtγ )p(θtγ )〈ηνTt |σi|ηνTt 〉2

=
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
∏
γ
 ∑
tγ ,rtγ ,θtγ
1
48
〈ηνTt |σi|ηνTt 〉2
 ,
where as before tγ denotes the location of the trap qubit in set Sγ . Averaging over all values of tγ ,
rtγ and θtγ , we obtain
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
∏
γ
(
1− wγ
6
)
≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
∏
γ
(
1− 1
6
)wγ
=
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
(
5
6
)∑
γ wγ
≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
(
5
6
)d 2d
5
e
≤
(
5
6
)d 2d
5
e
,
where wγ denotes the number of independently detectable errors which fall within set Sγ . In the
special case of all classical output, however, the bound can be made tighter, since |ηνtγ 〉 = |rνtγ 〉, and
hence
pincorrect ≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
∏
γ
Tr
∑
tγ ,rtγ
1
6
〈rνtγ |σi|t|rνtγ 〉2

≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
∏
γ
(
1− wγ
3
)
≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
∏
γ
(
1− 1
3
)wγ
=
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
(
2
3
)∑
γ wγ
≤
∑
k
∑
i/∈I
|αki|2
(
2
3
)d 2d
5
e
≤
(
2
3
)d 2d
5
e
.
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8 Conclusions and discussion
We have extended the original universal blind quantum computing (UBQC) protocol presented in
[9] with new concepts of blind preparation of isolated dummy qubits (a qubit prepared randomly in
the set {|0〉 , |1〉}) and isolated trap qubits (a qubit prepared randomly in the set {|+〉θ}). These two
modifications lead to a new construction for unconditionally verifiable blind quantum computation.
However, in this way only polynomially bounded security could be achieved. Building upon these
ideas, combined with fault-tolerant computation, we presented a new UBQC protocol that achieve
exponentially bounded security for the verification scheme using new resource state, the dotted-
complete graph state. The new protocol extend the topological fault-tolerant measurement-based
quantum computation scheme due to Raussendorf, Harrington and Goyal [44] to a blind setting.
We note that while consideration of fault-tolerance in the blind computation itself is beyond the
scope of the present work, if Protocol 8 is modified so as to allow Alice to accept a finite error rate
on the trap qubits, the probability of Bob successfully cheating is exponentially suppressed in the
gap between the expected error weight inferred from trap measurements and our threshold of d2d5 e,
and so a fault-tolerant adaptation of this protocol should be possible.
As mentioned before, a verifiable UBQC protocol can be viewed as an interactive proof system
where Alice acts as the verifier and Bob as the prover [2, 9, 45]. This link to complexity theory
suggests a novel approach to questions such as the open problem of finding an interactive proof
for any problem in BQP with a BQP prover, but with a purely classical verifier. The conceptual
link between blindness and interactive proof systems is the key ingredient for verifying the “high
complexity” quantum-theoretical models with “low complexity” classical ones.
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